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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ExcELSIOR IRoN niiNING CoMPANY, a cor-
poration, and UTAH CoNSTRUCTION 
CoMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
CLARENCE I. J usTHEIM and 
RoBERT GoRLINSKI, 
Defendants and .Appellants, Case No. 7825 
CLARENCE I. J USTHEIM, 
C.ross-Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
vs. 
ExcELSIOR IRoN MINING CoMPANY, a cor-
poration, and UTAH CoNSTRUCTION 
CoMPANY, a corporation, 
Cross-Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 16, 1879, the United States Govern-
ment patented and conveyed to J·oseph R. Walker and 
Jediah !1. Blair the Armstrong placer which embraced 
the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Sec-
1 
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tion 32 in Township 35 South of Range 12 West, in 
Iron .Springs Mining District in Iron County, Utah. 
The area conveyed in the placer claim consisted of 
38.24 acres. Also by this patent there was conveyed to 
the patentees the "Armstrong Iron Mine", designated 
as Lot 41 by the Surveyor General. This "iron mine" 
was patented as a known existing lode· claim within the 
patented placer claim (R. 95). It embraced 1.76 acres, 
and its length was 396 feet in the approximate direc-
tion of Northeast to Southwest and its width was 210 
feet. In describing the lode claim the patent fixed the 
quarter section corner on the Westerly boundary line 
of Section 32 above, as bearing West 790 feet from the 
Southwesterly corner of said claim (Corner No. 2) 
(R. 23). 
In 1902 one Thomas J. Jones made a location known 
as Cora No. 1, which he thereafter amended. When 
the Surveyor ._General made the survey for the Cora 
No. 1 he discovered that the description of the ''Arm-
strong Iron Mine'' contained in the Walker-Blair pat-
ent (R. 231) was erroneous in the fact that the South 
line of the Armstrong placer claim (Southwest quarter 
of Northwest quarter of Section 32, aforesaid) was 
approximately 135 feet South of the South line of the 
Armstrong "iron mine". Stated otherwise, the west 
quarter corner of Section 32 was not due west of the 
Southwest corner of the ''iron mine'' as described 
in the Walker-Blair ~patent, but in truth the quar-
ter corner was located South 79 de g. 09' West 839 feet 
from Corner No. 1 of the Cora No. 1 lode claim, 
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"'' .. hich Corner No. 1 \Ya~ 102 feet west of the South-
\vest eorner (or Corner No. 2) of the .A . rn1strong "iron 
mine" (Stipulation, Exhibit A, R. 33). With this con-
dition existing, it is apparent that a hiatus existed 
between the south boundary line of the ''iron Inine'' 
and the true south line of the Southwest quarter of 
the X orth,vest quarter of Section 32 aforesaid. This 
hiatus has been denominated in the record of trial as 
· · conflict area ' ' ( R. 96, 97) . 
The patent to Thon1as J. Jones issued on August 
12, 1912 conveyed the Cora No. 1 by metes and bounds 
and fixed the location of corner No. 1 as being at a 
point from which the quarter corner of Section 32 afore-
said is located South 79 deg. 09' West 839 feet distant 
(R. 26). It will be thus noted that the location of the 
West quarter corner of Section 32 aforesaid as set forth 
in the Walker-Blair patent does not correspond with 
the location as stated in the Jones patent. It is mani-
fest by a comparison of the description of the ''iron 
mine" contained in the W'alker-Blair patent with the 
description of the commencement point of description 
of the Cora· No. 1 lode claim that corner No. 1 of the 
latter claim is 102 feet due West of corner No. 2 of 
the Arn1strong Iron- Mine. Therefore, the ·Jones patent 
would have covered the hiatus or ''conflict area'' had 
not the Jones patent contained exceptions which elimi-
nated it in the conveyance to Jones ( R. 26, 27, 28, 33) 
The description in the Jones patent of the Cora 
No. 1 first embraces an area contained within eight 
courses. This area is shown on Exhibit A of the Stipu-
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lation (R. 33) in heavy white lines and the area is iden-
tified ~as "Cora No. 1 (amended) ". The patent however 
contained important qualifications and exceptions which 
serve in a radical manner to modify and limit the area 
actually conveyed to Thomas J. Jones. Tiaken verbatim 
from the patent, these qualifications and exceptions 
read as follows: 
''excepting and excluding from these presents 
all that portion of the ground, hereinbefore 
described, embraced in said mining claim, or lot 
No. 48 and ·said southwest quarter of the north-
west quarter of Section thirty-two except tract A 
described as follows; Beginning at a point on 
line 8-1 of said Cora No. 1 lode claim west 281.1 
feet from corner No. 8; thence west 50 feet; 
thence South 11 degrees 30' West 126.2 feet; 
thence North 80 deg. 10' East 50.4 feet; thence 
North 11 degrees 30' East 124.6 feet to the place 
of beginning; and also all that portion of said 
Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and all veins, lodes and 
ledges, throughout their entire depth, the tops' 
or apexes of w.hich lie inside of such excluded 
ground; Survey No. 4797 extending 1273.6 feet 
in length along said Cora No. 1 vein or lode; the 
premises herein gran ted, containing 9. 725 acres, 
more or less." (R. 27) 
For a proper understanding of the operative effect 
of the exceptions ·contained in the Jones patent and 
their results, it is necessary to describe certain legal 
proceedings and other matters which ensued concern-
ing the ''conflict area''. Counsel for the app~ellee 
Excelsior Iron Mining Company, in his opening state-
ment summarized these proceedings as follows: 
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''By conveyances from the patentee of the 
..:-\.r1nstrong Placer and the Armstrong Mine the 
predecessor of the plaintiff in this case, the Excel-
sior Iron l\Iining Company, became the owner 
of the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong· Iron 
nline, and in 1904, in Case No. 522, in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, 
the Excelsior Iron ~fining Company as owners 
of the ..... \rmstrong Placer and the Armstrong Iron 
l\line brought suit to quiet title against Jones 
to the conflict area. At the same time the Excel-
sior Iron Mining Company brought suits against 
other individuals involving other areas within 
the .... \.rmstrong Placer. There were four suits, 
~o. 519, No. 520, No. 521 and No. 522 brought in 
the United States District Court. At that time 
bear in mind, your Honor, a patent had been 
issued to the Armstrong Placer and Armstrong 
Iron Mine in 1879, so that the patent had been 
outstanding twenty-five years when the Excel-
sior brought this suit against Jones to quiet title 
against him to the conflict area, and Judge 
Marshall entered a decree in that case quieting 
title to the conflict area. * * * Judge Marshall 
quieted title to that conflict area in Jones. 
" * * * The applicant and the locator of the 
Cora. His location was then in good standing, 
but he had not yet applied for patent, but the 
conflict area was quieted in Jones. 
"Subsequently and in the year 1906 another 
suit in which the Excelsior sought to quiet title 
to that same area was instituted in the United 
States District Court fQr the District of Utah 
and that is Case 1053. That case was p·artially 
tried when a stipulation was entered upon and 
it was agreed that Jones might patent this con-
flict area provided he would sell it after patent 
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to the Excelsior Iron Mining Comp·any. Pur-
suant to that stipulation Judge Marshall made 
and entered his decree in Case 1053 quieting 
title to the conflict area in Thomas R. Jones. 
Those decrees, however, did not in any way 
adversely affect Excelsior's placer rights in the 
conflict area. 
' ' THE CouRT : You mean as placer mining 
claims7 
"MR. PAUL H. RAY: Yes, as placer mine claims. 
The government having granted this placer 
ground in 1879, it could not be granted again to 
anybody else, but Judge Marshall pursuant to 
the stipulation of the parties, decided that case 
in favor of Jones, the locator of the Cora. Jones 
then filed his application for patent to this area. 
The proceedings had in the Federal Court would 
indicate that the parties thought that it would be 
a matter of six months or less before Jones could 
acquire a patent covering this area, and par-
ticularly that ore body. But it was a matter of 
several years before patent was actually received 
and when Jones applied for his patent his appli-
cation was rejected because he undertook to get 
a patent to that entire conflict area, and that 
brought into focus a rule of mining law which I 
would like to remind your Honor :about. The 
statute provides that if one applies for a placer 
claim and within it there is a known lode he 
must pay at the rate of $2.50 per acre for placer 
ground and $5.00 an acre for lode location, but 
since the placer rights covered the entire sur-
face, the lode locator is limited to twenty-five 
feet on either side of the lode taken as a line or 
a total of fifty feet surface rights. Now, the 
statute limits him to fifty feet of surface rights 
so as to minimize the interference with the placer 
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surf~ace rights. Do I make 1nyself clear? 
·'THE CouRT: That is only when the lode is 
within the limits of the prior placer claim 7 
''~lR. PAUL H. RAY: Yes. The statute gener-
ally-the general statute, if your Honor please, 
proYides that the lode locator may have 600 
feet on the width and 1500 feet on the strike or 
length of the claim. 600 by 1500. But when that 
location is m·a.de \Yithin the placer claim the lode 
is limited to fifty feet, it being the assumption 
that fifty feet is enough surface right to ~permit 
of the mining and removal of the entire lode. 
··X ow, the courts have held, and we think 
there is no authority to the contrary, that when 
a stranger to the placer location locates upon a 
known lode within the placer location he is lim-
ited to fifty feet of surface and that within the 
ap:Qlication of that rule the Land Department 
refused to give Jones a patent to the entire con-
flict area because the en tire conflict area lies 
within the Armstrong Placer. So the patent he 
finally got to the Cora was a tract fifty feet wide 
within the conflict area indicated on this map 
as Tract A, if the court please, and the survey 
maps will indicate that the middle of that fifty-
foot tract is equidistant from the end lines of 
the conflict area. So he got fifty feet in his 
patent in the middle of the conflict 'area. Having 
secured that patent he then called upon Excel-
sior Iron Mining Company, our predecessor in 
interest, to pay the purchase price for this lode, 
and our predecessor in interest said no, you 
agreed to convey to us the entire lode as it 
exists in the conflict area. This land here, our 
people said to Mr. Jones, 'No, you can't sell us 
that and get our money because our understand-
ing was that we were going to get the entire 
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lode.' So Mr. Jones or his successors in interest 
sued us for the purchase price. 
''MR. RITER: That was the C. F. & I. 
"MR. PAuL H. RAY: That case is entitled Col-
orado Fuel & Iron Company against the Excel-
sior Iron Mining Company and E. 0. Howard, 
and was filed in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah and is identified as Law 
3044. The issue in that case was whether 
C. F. & I., successor to Jones, was able to deliver 
to us the ore body within the .conflict area. 
"THE CouRT: Was C. F. & I. prede.cessor of 
your companyY 
"MR. PAuL H. RAY: No, they are the succes-
sor of Jones. They were the suc;Cessor of Jones 
'and we as owner of this Armstrong Placer-Arm-
strong Mine-we had an agreement from Jones, 
we agreed· on our part that Jones would sell us 
the ore .body within that conflict area and we 
.agreed we would pay for it. So when he got a 
patent describing only 50 feet of surface area 
we contended that we weren't bound to pay the 
purchase price because he was not :able to deliver 
to us title to that lode. That was litigated before 
Judge Johnson, and contentions were made before 
Judge Johnson with re'Spect to apex, hanging 
walls, foot walls and so forth and so on~ 
"MR. W. W. RAY: And all of the surface, too. 
' 'MR. PAUL H. RAY : And all of the surface. 
Now, bear this in mind, your Honor, if that had 
not been, if that conflict area had not been ~a part 
of a prior valid placer claim, this area patented 
to Jones would not have been fifty feet wide, 
it would have been '600 feet wide and would 
have covered the entire conflict area. The only 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reason it "·as fifty feet instead of 600 feet is 
because it was in a prior, valid, subsisting placer 
claim. If it hadn't been the law would have 
required the Land Office to give the 600 feet in 
width, but being in the p1acer claim there were 
not only no requirements that he get 600 feet, 
but there was a limitation to fifty feet. Fifty 
feet 'vas all he could have, it being the policy 
of the la'v that fifty feet in surface is adequate to 
mine the entire lode. Jones came along in ,defense 
and he said 'That fifty feet that I bought from 
you on the surface gives you the entire lode.' 
We said 'No, it gives us less than the entire lode 
and nothing less than the entire lode will satisfy 
your obligation to us.' 
~'Judge Johnson ruled against us. He entered 
his decree holding that that fifty feet of surface 
right carried with it the entire lode and that 
when Jones conveyed us that fifty feet of sur-
face he conveyed to us the entire lode. 
''We made this contention before Judge John-
son: If that fifty feet of surface is all we get, 
then one day somebody will make some locations 
along here and deprive us of the ore body Jones 
has agreed to sell us. And Judge Johnson said : 
No, nobody will ever make a valid location upon 
any part of that ore body because that fifty feet 
carries that ore body with it, lock, stock and 
barrel, and he so decreed. '' 
(R. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102) 
It w·as agreed at trial that by valid deeds of con-
veyance properly delivered :and recorded, plaintiff Excel-
sior Iron ~lining Company, a corporation, became and 
ever since May 7, 1940 has been the owner of the Arm-
~trong Placer and Arn1strong Iron Mine (R. 26). Also, 
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it was agreed at trial that plaintiff Excelsior Iron Min-
ing Company, became and ever since May 7, 1940, has 
been, and now is the owner of. all the property con-
veyed and patented by the United States Government 
to Jones by patent above described in his favor dated 
August 26, 1912 ( R. 28). The plaintiff, Utah Construc-
tion Company, a corporation, has been since June 11, 
1946 in possession of the Armstrong Placer and Arm-
strong ''iron mine'' under a written agreement of lease 
with its co-plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Company 
(R. 26). 
Being advised and believing that the hiatus or 
''conflict area'' was public do maiD: and subject to loca-
tion under the mining laws of the United States and 
the State of Utah, the defendant Justheim on April 30, 
1949 entered upon said 'area and located the same as 
Lucky, Lucky #1, Lucky #2 and Lucky #3 (R. 218, 219, 
221-224, 235, 238-243). The location notices on Lucky 
#1, Lucky #2 and Lucky #3 (Exs.- 6, 7, 8) were recorded 
in the office of the County Recorder of Iron County, 
Utah, and were at the trial received in evidence (R. 223). 
The proof of location and recording of notice of loca-
tion ·of Lucky and the approved patent survey (Sur-
vey 7221) was duly ;app·roved (Ex. 5, R. 243). The 
marking on the ground of corners of these claims and 
the placement in position of the discovery monument 
with proper notices were also proved at the trial 
(R. 237-244). 
The defendant J ustheim also offered proof that 
he had done required 'assessrnent work for the years 
10 
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1950 and 1951 on the four clain1s (R. 245, 246, Exs. 9, 
10, 11, 12. 13, 14, 15, 16). 
In August, 1949, the plaintiffs commenced an action 
against the defendants aboved named to quiet title in 
Excelsior Iron Mining Company (hereinafter designated 
''Excelsior") as owner, to the ''conflict area". The 
con1plaint particularly described the conflict area, al-
leged that the defendants claim an interest therein -ad-
Yerse to plaintiffs, but that such claim is without right, 
and that the defendants have no right, title, estate or 
interest whatever in and to said 'area or any part thereof 
as against the title and right to possession by plaintiffs. 
(R. 1, 2, 3). The defendants answered the complaint, 
ad1nitting the corporate existence of the plaintiffs, but 
denying all :Other allegations therein contained. At the 
time of answering defendant Justheim served and filed 
a cross-complaint which described the location by defend-
ant Justheim of the Lucky, Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 
and Lucky No. 3 lode mining claim·s within t·he "conflict 
area, '' alleged that the conflict area was public domain 
under the mining laws of the United States of America· 
at the time of said locations, subject to entry .by the 
defendant Justheim, and alleged that the said mining 
claims are valid, existing claims. Further the .said defend-
ant and cross plaintiff J ustheim alleged that the plaintiffs 
claim some right, title, claim or interest in or to said 
premises consisting of said mining claims adverse to the 
defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim. That such claim 
was without right and that the plaintiffs and cross de-
fendants have no right, title, estate or interest whatever 
11 
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in or to. said premises or any part thereof against the 
title and right to possession of the defendant and cross 
plaintiff J ustheim. The defendant and cross plaintiff, 
Justheim prayed for judgment quieting title in him as 
the sole and exclusive owner of said mining claims and 
debarring plaintiffs and cross defendants from asserting 
any claim whatsoever in or to .said mining claims or any 
part thereof or to any ore or minerals lying in or upon 
said premises adverse to the right, title, claim and in-
terest of said J ustheim. (R. 6-10). The plaintiffs and 
cross defendants replied to defendant Justheim's counter-
claim denying that the conflict area was unoccupied, 
unclaimed mineral land of the United States and denying 
that the same or any part thereof was subject to location 
under the laws .of the United States or otherwise. Said 
plaintiffs denied that the defendant and cros.s plaintiff 
J ustheim ever went upon and explored said premises 
und -denied there ·ever was upon or within said pre1nises 
any lode except the lode which was conveyed and ·patented 
by the United States to the predecess-ors in interest of 
the plaintiffs; denied that the defendant Justheim ever 
made any discovery or location upon the conflict area; 
denied that said J ustheim was ever in possession of the 
claims· des·cribed in his cross complaint or ·any part 
thereof, and denied that he ever prepared to work the 
same. Further answering the cross compJaint the cross 
defendants alleged that they were lawfully and right-
fully in exclusive possession of said premises ~and that 
the plaintiff, Excelsior, was at all times the lawful owner 
of said property, subject to the rights of plaintiff, Utah 
12 
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Construction Company (hereinafter designated '' C·on-
struction' ') as lessee of the same. As further answer 
and defense the plaintiffs ·alleged that the conflict area 
lies entirely within the limits of the Armstrong Placer 
Claim, which comprises the Southwest quarter of the 
North,vest quarter of Section 32, in Township 35 South, 
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in Ir'on 
County, Utah .. Further the plaintiffs alleged that all 
of the minerals lying within the conflict area lie within 
the Armstrong Placer Mine and Armstrong Iron Mine 
(designated by the Surveyor General as Lot No. 41) and 
that Excelsior is the lawful owner of the Armstrong Placer 
~line, the Armstrong Mine (Lot No. 41) and Cora No. 1 
Lode Mine, and all of the minerals contained therein and 
that Excelsior is entitled to exclusive possession thereof 
subject to the rights of the plaintiff, Construction, as 
lessee. (R. 12-14.) As a further answer and defense 
plaintiffs and cross defendants alleged that for more 
than 20 years prior to April 30, 1949 plaintiff Excelsior 
was the owner of and in the open, adverse, notorious and 
exclusive possession of the conflict area and that during 
all of said time Excelsior and its lessee, Construction, 
paid all taxes levied and assessed upon and against said 
property. Further plaintiffs and cross defendants !alleged 
that on April 30, 1949 and long prior thereto, Excelsior, 
by its lessee, Construction, was actively working, oper-
ating and mining the property described in plaintiffs' 
complaint and in the counterclaim and cross· complaint 
of d~fendant Justheim iand that on said day defendant 
J ustheim, after working hours and in the evening of 
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said day, surreptitiously and without right, came upon 
said property and pretended to -make lode locations 
thereon. In elaboration of this allegation the plaintiffs 
alleged that said locations were made upon mining land 
which had theretofore been patented by the United States 
to plaintiffs' predecessors in interest and were without 
right or validity. (R. 14, 15.) 
As a further -defense the plaintiffs alleged that the 
counterclaim and cross complaint of defendant and cross 
plaintiff J ustheim is barred by the provisions of Section 
7, Chapter 2, Title 104, Utah Code 1943, and Section 8, 
Chapter 2, Title 30, United States Code Annotated. 
(R. 15.) 
The defendants, Justheim and Gorlinski, and the 
defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim served and filed 
their rejoinder to plaintiffs' and cross defendants' an-
swer, which denied the principal affirmative allegations 
of s'aid_answer and alleged that on the 30th day of April, 
1949 and for a long period prior thereto the plaintiff, 
Excelsior by its less~e Construction entered upon the 
conflict area and removed ore and minerals therefrom 
without the consent of the United States of America 
and without the consent of defendan-ts and without the 
·consent of the defendant and cross plaintiff Justheim. 
The said reply reaffirmed the validity of the location 
of the Lucky, Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 and Lucky No. 
3 lode mining claims and the ownership thereof by the 
defendant :and cross plaintiff Justheim and alleged that 
the plaintiffs were trespassers upon the public domain 
14 
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,vithout right or title. The prayer of said reply affirn1ed 
the prayer of the defendants and of the defendant and 
cross plaintiff Justheim contained in his cross com-
plaint. 
In order to eliminate time and effort in making 
proof ·of certain undisputed facts in this case counsel 
for plaintiffs and counsel for defendants and cross 
plaintiff Justheim entered into a formal written stipu-
lation (R. 22-32) wherein are set forth verbatim the 
patent to Walker and Blair covering the Armstrong 
Placer and .A .. r1nstrong ''iron mine'' ( R. 22-2'6) and the 
patent to Thomas J. Jones covering Cora No. 1 mining 
claim (R. 26-28). By said stipulation it was further 
agreed that the plaintiff Excelsior, by valid deeds of 
conveyance, ever since May 7, 1940, h.as been the owner 
of the Arn1strnog Placer and Armstrong ''iron mine'', 
and that the same has been under lease to Construction 
ever since June 11, 1946. It was further agreed that 
the plaintiff Excelsior, by virtue of valid deeds of con-
veyance, has been since May 7, 1940, .and is now the 
owner of all the property conveyed and patented to 
Thomas J. Jones under the patent covering the Cora 
No.1 mining claim; that Jones and his wife quitclaimed 
and conveyed to the predecessor in interest of plaintiff 
Excelsior all their right, title, claim and interest in and 
to the conflict area; (R. 28-29) that ·plaintiff Excelsior 
is now and ever since May 7, 1940 has been the owner 
of all the right, title and interest in said property which 
belonged to Jones and wife prior to the delivery of 
said quitclaim deed. It was further agreed that on May 
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7, 1940 'a certain corporation known and designated· as 
Excelsior Iron Miriing Company, a Wyoming corpora-
tion, sold and conveyed to plaintiff Excelsior certain 
mining property in Iron Springs Mining District in 
Iron County, Utah, particularly described. Included 
in the description is the ·~rmstrong Lode Mining Claim, 
United States Lot No. 41, all that part .and portion of 
the Cora Lode Mining Claim, Survey No. 4791, lying 
~and being within the Southwest quarter of the North-
west quarter of Section 32, Township 35 South, Range 
12 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and .als-o the Armstrong 
Placer. (R. 29) It was further .agreed that plaintiff 
Construction, since June 11, 1946 has been and now is 
in the lawful possession of all property particul'arly 
described above which belongs to plaintiff Excelsior. 
(R. 29). 
T~he stipulation then sets forth the claim of plaintiff, 
Excelsior, as follows : 
(a) That by reason of the conveyance from the 
Wyoming corporation it is the owner of all ores and 
minerals lying upon or within all mining gr·ound bounded 
by the boundary lines of Armstrong Placer and that 
the defendants have no right, title or interest therein. 
{b) That plaintiff Construction claims that as 
less.ee it is and .at all times since June 11, 1946 has been 
lawfully entitled to occupy and possess all of the prop-
erty conveyed to pl'aintiff Excelsior by the Wyoming 
corporation and to mine and remove all ores and min-
16 
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erals lying upon or within the same, free of any claim 
whatsoever of either of the defendants. 
By said stipulation plaintiffs and each of them 
deny that the conflict ~area was open to lode location 
by the defendants and deny that defendants ever m.ade 
any valid or la,Yfnl mining location upon s·aid property 
or any part thereof. The stipulation further sets forth 
that the defendants and the cross pl,aintiff Justheim 
deny that the plaintiffs or either of them became or 
are the o\vner or entitled to possession of the ores or 
minerals lying upon or in the property described in the 
notices of location by the defendant and cross plaintiff 
Justheim and particularly known and designated 'as 
Lucky, Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 and Lucky N·o. 3, and 
it is recited in the :stipulation that the defendants allege 
and assert that on April 30, 1949, they made valid lode 
locations on the conflict 'area. 
There were attached to said stipulation and made 
a part thereof certain exhibits. Exhibit B is a true 
and correct copy of the field notes and survey plat 
of the Armstrong Mining Claim made by Ferdinand 
Dickert. Exhibit C is 'a true and correct copy of the 
field notes of Cora No. 1 Lode made by Mayhew H. 
Dalley. Exhibit D is a true .and correct copy of the field 
notes of the Amended Survey of Cora No. 1 Lode made 
by Guy Sterling. The fact that these exhibits are true 
copies of what they purport to represent is admitted 
by the stipulation for the purpose of relieving defend-
ants and cross plaintiff Justheim from proving their 
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~authenticity, but the facts stated ·therein and the com-
petency, relevancy and materiality of said exhibits or 
either of them or any part thereof, are not admitted 
and their admissibility as evidence in this case for any 
purpose was reserved for ruling by the court. Each 
party particularly reserved the right in said stipulation 
to present and introduce .at the trial of the :action other 
and additional testim~ony and evidence. (R. 30-31). 
It was agreed that the issues to be determined by 
the court were : 
(a) Was any part of the land described in para-
graph 12 above [the areas described in the four notices 
of location made by defendant and cross plaintiff Just-
heim] or the ores or minerals therein open and subject 
to lode location by defendants on April 30 1949. 
(b) If said land or the ores or minerals upon or 
therein were subject to location on the 30th day of 
April 1949, did defendants or either of them make a 
valid location upon said land or any part thereof. (R. 
31-32). 
By agreement of counsel the said ~action was tried 
on November 9, 10 and 17, 1951, in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, before the Honorable Will L. Hoyt, Judge of the 
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State 
of Utah, in and for Iron County. (R. 94-95). 
Thereafter on February 11, 1952, the said court 
made, entered and filed its Findings of Fact ~and Con-
clusions of Law. (R. 70-83) The Findings ·of Fact. may 
be summarized as follows: 
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Finding No. 1 : The verbatim rep~oduction of the 
patent covering the Armstrong Placer and Armstrong 
Hiron 1nine", dated Decen1ber 16, 1879, to Walker and 
Blair. ( R. 70-73). 
Finding No. ~ : By valid deeds of conveyance prop-
erly delivered and recorded, plaintiff, Excelsior Iron 
Mining Co1npany, a corporation, became and ever since 
the 7th day of ~lay, 1940, has been the owner of the 
Arn1strong Placer and the Armstrong ''iron mine''. 
(R. 74). 
Finding No. 3: By the terms of a written lease, 
plaintiff, Utah Construction Company, is and ·ever since 
the 11th day of June, 194'6 has been in the lawful pos-
session of said Armstrong Placer and said Armstrong 
"iron mine". (R. 74). 
Finding No. 4: The verbatim reproduction of the 
patent ·covering the Cora N·o. 1 Mining Claim dated 
August 26, 1912, to Thomas J. Jones. (R. 74-76). 
Finding No. 5 : By valid ·deeds of conveyance prop ... 
· erly executed, delivered ~and recorded, plaintiff, Ex-
celsior Iron 1\tlining Company, became and ever since 
the 7th day of May, 1940, has been and now is the owner 
of all the property conveyed and patented by the United 
States Government as hereinbefore in paragraph 4 :set 
forth. (R. 76). 
Finding No. 6: In his notice of lode location and 
in his ~application for patent of Cora No. 1 Lode, 
Amended, Thomas J. Jones included a portion of the 
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Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 
32, Township 35 South, Range 12 West, which portion 
particularly describes an area me.asuring approximately 
135.1 feet North and South-on the West line thereof and 
114.1 feet on its East line, 'and 600 feet in breadth [the 
same being the conflict .area]. ( R. 7 6-77). 
Finding No. 7 : The area described in paragraph 
6 next ahove was included in the Armstrong Placer 
claim patent to Joseph R. Walker and Jediah M. Blair, 
as set forth in finding 1 above. Such area or parcel of 
land was referred to upon the trial as the ''conflict 
area'', and is the 'area or parcel of land particularly 
involved in this case. (R. 77). 
Finding No. 8: The four lode_ locations referred 
to in defendant Justheim's cross complaint and counter-
claim, and as to which said cross-plaintiffs pray for a 
decree quieting title in him as against the plaintiffs, 
are described and identified as Lucky, Lucky No. 1, 
Lucky. No.2, and Lucky No. 3. All four of said claims 
located by defendants lie entirely within the conflict 
area a·s described in finding 6 above. (R. 77). 
Finding No. 9: That portion of the surface of the 
conflict area which was conveyed by U. S. Patent re-
ferred to in finding 4 above was referred to· and iden-
tified upon the trial of this case as "Tract A". (R. 77). 
Finding No. 10 : The ore body involved in this case 
is roughly elliptical in shape, app·roximately 960 feet 
long and from 100 to 300 feet wide, and extends length-
wise from 'a line or point about 300 feet south -of the 
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area here involved, thence Northeasterly into and 
through the Lucky claims and Tract A, and thence 
~ortheasterly for at least 400 feet through the· Arm-
strong lode, Lot 41, as the same is described in finding 
1 above. (R. 77). 
Finding N·o. 11: Said ore body was, prior to its 
being mined by plaintiffs, a body of iron bearing rock 
in place embedded in a troughlike depression with its 
walls converging as they descend. (R. 78). 
Finding No. 12: On April 30, 1949 and for a long 
time prior thereto, the plaintiff, Utah Construction Com-
pany,., was and had been engaged in mining and re-
moving ore from the conflict area, including the area 
embraced within the Lucky lode locations .and within 
Tract A. On said day plaintiff, Utah Construction Com~ 
pany, 'Yas and ha·d been engaged in mining and remov-
ing ore from the conflict area including the area em-
braced 'vithin the Lucky lode locations and within 
Tract A. On said day, plaintiff, Utah Construction Com-
pany, had about fifteen men working with heavy equip-
ment mining and removing ore from the op·~n pit extend-
ing over and including the discovery point and most of 
the area embraced within the Lucky locations. (R. 78). 
Finding No. 13: After the men working and min-
ing the said area had quit for the day on the evening 
of Ap·ril 30, 1949 and after they had left the place of 
work, defendants went upon the workings in said ore 
pit and posted their notices of location of the Lucky, 
Lucky No. 1, Lucky No. 2 and Lucky No. 3 lode mining· 
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claims, marked the corners of said claims, and thereafter 
recorded copies of such notices of location. (R. 78). 
Finding No. 14: At the time of the posting ·of notices 
of location of the Lucky claims there w.as one, and only 
one, oody of mineral bearing rock in place outcropping 
in the area elll:braced in said claims, and it was the same 
ledge which extended into Armstrong Iron Mine lode 
claim, Lot 41. Said ore body was als·o the same ledge 
or body of ore which extended into the Cora No. 1 lode 
claim. (R. 78). 
Finding No. 15 : The discovery of the Cora No. 1 
lode claim is located at or near the intersection of the 
center line of Tract A with the south boundary of Tract 
A (being the south boundary of the Southwest quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of Section 32, Township 35 
South of Range 12 West, Salt Lake Meridian; which 
is the Armstrong placer ·claim). The said discovery 
of the Cora No. 1 lode claim as amended is located upon 
the same lode or deposit of iron upon which the pre-
tended discovery of each of the Lucky claims was 
marked. (R. 78). 
Finding No. 16: Since ~about January, 1948, plain-
tiff, Utah Construction Company, as lessee of plaintiff, 
Exeelsior Iron Mining Company, ha.s been developing, 
working and mining the ore body lying within the con-
flict area, -and have (sic.) removed large quantities of 
ore therefrom. At all times while so mining said prop-
erty plaintiffs have claimed to be the owners of both 
the surface of said area and the ·ore body contained 
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therein. Neither of the plaintiffs nor the plaintiffs' 
predecessors have been working the ore body in contro-
versy continuously for a. period of seven years next 
prior to .. A. pril 3, 1949. ( R. 79). 
Finding No. 17: The entire area attempted to be 
located by the defendants as lode claims Lucky, Lucky 
No. 1, Lucky N·o. 2 and Lucky No. 3, is within the South-
west quarter of the N orth,vest quarter of Section 32, 
Township 35 South, Range 12 West, S·alt Lake Merid-
ian, being the area covered by the 'P~atent to the Arm-
strong placer claim set forth in finding 1 above .. That 
lode or body of ·ore, being the body of ore involved in 
this case, was clearly visible on the surface .and was 
known to exist at the time of the application for p~atent 
to the Armstrong placer, and was intended to he de-
scribed in, and covered by, ·description of the Armstrong 
Iron Mine, Lot No. 41, but because of an error in the 
survey which attempted to establish·th~ south boundary 
of said southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of 
said Section 32, the ground in controversy was not 
covered by the metes and bounds description of the 
Armstrong lr·on Mine, Lot No. 41, and therefore, by 
inadvertence, the conflict area was not described in 
the U. S. Patent as a part of the Armstrong Iron Mine, 
Lot No. 41, lr·on Springs Mining District, Iron County, 
Utah. (R. 79). 
Finding No. 18: Plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining 
Company, as successor in interest of J.oseph R. Walker 
and J ediah M. Blair, patentees in the patent referred 
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to in finding 1, and as successor in interest of Thomas 
J. Jones, patentee in the patent referred to in finding 
4,. succeeded to all of the rights ·of said patentees, and is 
the owner of the entire area ·described in finding 6 and 
referred to as the ''conflict area'', including the entire 
surface thereof, and all the ores · and minerals lying 
upon or within said area. (R. 79-80). 
Finding No. 19: The lode or vein lying within the 
Armstflong Iron Mine, Lot No. 41, and within the con-
flict area, including the four Lucky ·claims and ''Tract 
A'', is a single indivisible lode or body of ·ore, and the 
discovery within Tract A lies upon the apex of said 
lode or vein. (R. 80). 
From said Findings the court concluded: 
1. The body of ore herein involved was a single 
lode within the meaning of the United States Mining 
Law. (R. 80). 
2. The outcrop on ''Tract A'' was part of the 
apex of said lode, and the discovery on the Cora No. 1 
lode amended was on such apex within the meaning of 
the mining laws. (R. 80). 
3. Whether the ore body contained within the con-
flict area and within the area embraced by the four 
Lucky lode locations passed from the United States 
by patent referred to in Finding 1, or by force of the 
patent to Thomas J. Jones, referred to in Finding 4, the 
court concludes that plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining 
Company, as successor in interest of Joseph R. Walker 
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and Jediah M. Blair, patentees of the Armstrong placer 
clain1 and the Armstrong iron mine, Lot No. 41, and 
the success-or in interest ·of Thomas J. Jones, patentee 
of the Cora N·o. 1 lode as amended, is the owner_ of all 
the land described in plaintiffs' con1plaint and in Find-
ing 6 iof the foregoing findings, including .all of the 
surface thereof, and all of the ores or minerals lying 
upon or 'Yithin said land. The ownership and right of 
plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Comp-any, is subject 
only to the rights of its lessee, Utah Construction Com-
pany. (R. 80). 
4. On April 30, 1949, the area embraced within the 
four Lucky locations 'vas not open to location under the 
mining laws of the United States or the State of Utah 
by ~defendants, or anyone else. Such area was not public 
domain, but that each and every part thereof, together 
with .all the mirierals lying upon or therein, was and is 
the property of plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Com-
pany, subject only to the rights of its lessee, the plain-
tiff, Utah Construction Company. (R. 80-81). 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to the decree of this court 
quieting their title as against defendants to the entire 
conflict area, including all of the area embraced within 
the four Lucky claims. (R. 81). 
6. The defendants are entitled to take nothing by 
their cross complaint or counterclaim, and ·plaintiffs 
are entitled to have judgment a.s prayed, with their 
costs. (R. 81). 
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and C-on-
clusions of Law, the court, on February 11, 1952, made, 
entered and filed its judgment wherein and whereby it 
adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, Excelsior, sub-
ject only to the rig_hts of its lessee, Construction, is the 
owner :and entitled to the p-ossession of the conflict area., 
and decreeing that the defendants had no right, title 
or interest in and to the same. Title to said conflict area 
was by said judgment quieted in plaintiff, Excelsior, 
subject only to the rights of its lessee, Construction. 
(R. 82-83). 
Within the time allowed by law and the rules -of 
court, defendants served and filed their notice of ap-
pe~l (R. 85) and designation of record on appeal (R. 
86-87). In lieu of a cost bond the defendants deposited 
with the Clerk of the trial court $300.00 in cash funds. 
(R. 88). Thereafter the plaintiffs designated an addi-
tional -portion of the record. ( R. 90). On March 7, 1952, 
the record on ap-peal was filed in the office of the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EXISTENCE OF THE "CONFLICT 
AREA" ARISING OUT OF DISCREPANCIES IN 
THE SURVEY OF THE ARMSTRONG IRON 
MINE IS PROVED BEYOND DISPUTE AND 
IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
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"""-\.s heretofore stated, the patent from the United 
States Government dated September 16, 1879 in favor 
of ''"r"alker and Blair, conveying the Armstrong placer, 
also embraced a description of the Armstrong ''iron 
mine·' designated as Lot ±1 by the Surveyor General. 
It embraced 1.76 acres. In describing the "iron mine" 
the patent f:L~ed the quarterly section corner on the 
westerly boundary line of Section 32, Township 35 South, 
Range 1~ ''rest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, as bearing 
west 790 feet from the southwesterly corner of the ''iron 
mine," or its corner No. 2 (R. 23). Manifestly, this 
\\yas an error of the Surveyor General. When he made 
the survey for the Cora No. 1 lode claim, he discovered 
that the description contained in the Walker-Blair pat-
ent was erroneous. The south line of the Armstrong 
placer claim (being the south line of the sout·hwest quar~ 
ter of the north\v-est quarter of Section 32 aforesaid) did 
not correspond with the ·south line of the Armstrong 
''iron mine.'' The west quarter corner of Section 32 
was not due west of the southwest ·corner of the ''iron 
mine" as described in the Walker-Blair patent. The 
correct survey proved that said quarter corner was 
located south 79° 09' west 839 feet from corner No. 1 
of the Cora No. 1 lode claim, which corner No. 1 ·was 
102 feet we'St of the southwest corner (or corner No. 2) 
of the Armstrong ''iron mine'' (Stipulation Exhibit 
"A", R. 33). The plaintiffs, in their opening statement 
to the court, explain the ere a tion of the ''conflict area'' 
in the following manner: 
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'' * • • When the patent issued to the Arm-
strong Placer and the Armstl}ong Iron Mine it 
described the Armstrong Iron Mine as extend-
ing southerly to the southerly border of the 
Armstrong Placer, which is the section line, 
quarter ·section line. Now, when Mr. J.ones in 
1902, that is thirty years later, located upon the 
Cora No. 1 and the survey was made of the Cora 
No. 1 that survey indicated that the Armstrong 
Iron Mine .came only to this point (indicating on 
map) which is 135 feet north of the south line of 
the ArmstJ:ong Placer. 
''THE COURT: How do you read that it 
indicates that~ Was the description in the patent 
to the Armstrong Mine, did the description in 
the patent extend to the 40 line, or not~ 
''MR. PAUL H. RAY: The surveyor who 
surveyed for the Armstrong--or for Jones, said 
no it didn't. So that there then arose a conflict 
area in here. This 135 feet became conflict area. 
Plainly this 135 feet is clearly within the limits 
of the Armstrong Placer. The question then arose 
whether it also overlapped the Armstrong Iron 
Mine. As I stated to your Honor, the Cora No. 1 
lode was ·described as involving 135 feet which had 
been ~shown on this patent plat as a part of the 
Armstrong Mine. 
''So, for my purposes at this point, it is simply 
important for your Honor t·o understand that 
this became conflict area. Thereafter there began 
litigation involving what is known as the con-
flict area. ' ' ( R. 97) 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit ''A'' cle:arly demonstrates the 
existence of the "conflict area" and the causes for the 
existence of the same. The description of the Armstrong 
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~·iron Inine, '' or Lot 41, contained in the Walker-Blair 
patent (Stipulation R. 23), ,,~hen read in connection 
'vith the delineation on Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A," shows 
clearly that the "·esterly and ea.sterly boundary lines 
of the ·~iron n1ine '' did not extend to the south boundary 
line of the .... \rmstrong· placer claim, but the southerly 
termini of these lines 'vere approximately 135 feet 
northerly of the south boundary line of the placer claim. 
This situation is further reiterated by the plat marked 
Exhibit '•.A_'' attached to the stipul!ation (R. 33). 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit • 'K'' also demonstrates this hiatus. 
Defendant's Exhibits "4'' and "5" correctly corre-
late with the plaintiffs' exhibits hereinbefore mentioned 
and there results therefrom an accord and agreement in 
the proof as to the existence of the ''conflict area.'' 
The litiga,tion which ensued and which is described 
by plaintiffs' counsel in his ·opening statement, excerpts 
from \Yhich have been hereinbefore quoted, further icon-
firms the fact that the error in survey of the Walker-
Blair patent and the description of the Armstrong 
"iron mine" contained in that patent have long been 
known and have been the subject of periodic dispute 
between interested parties. 
Defendants assert that this evidence conclusively 
proves that the description of the Armstrong ''iron 
mine'' contained in the Walker-Blair patent did not de-
scribe that part of the mineral deposit contained in the 
"conflict area" and that therefore the discussion of 
interesting legal problems involved in th~s case must 
con1mence upon this undisputed .premise. For conveni-
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ence of the court, appellants have prepared from the 
·evidence and exhibits in this case a plat which, among 
other things, demonstrates the ''conflict area.'' This 
plat is inserted as a centerpiece of this brief. 
II. 
THE QUITCLAIM DEED EXECUTED AND 
DELIVERED BY THOMAS J. JONES AND EVA 
L. Ji01NES, HIS WIFE, DATED APRIL 29, 1916, 
TO EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, PREDECESSOR IN 
TITLE OF THE PLAINTIFF EXCELSIOR IRON 
MINING COMPANY, CONVEYED TO THE 
GRANTEE THEREIN NAMED i01NLY THE 
RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST OF THE GRAN-
TORS IN AND TO THE DEPOSIT OF MINERALS 
CONTAINED WITHIN THE "CONFLICT AREA" 
OWNED BY JONE,S AT THE DATE OF THE 
CONVEYANCE. 
At page 23 of the abstract of title (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
"AA") is shown 1a quitclaim deed dated April 29, 1916, 
wherein Thomas J. Jones and Eva L. Jones, his wife, 
are grantors, and Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a 
Wyoming corporation, is grantee. Subsequently, by a 
mining deed, shown at page 28 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
'' AA, '' the said Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a 
Wyoming corporation, conveyed to the plaintiff Excel-
sior Iron Mining Company, among other properties, 
"all that part or portion of the Cora lode mining claim, 
Survey No. 4791, lying and being within the southwest 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quarter of the north\vest quarter of Section 32, Town-
ship 35 South, Range 12 ''Test * * * together with all 
other property or rights or interests of s~aid ·corpora-
tion.'' The description contained in the deed from 
Thon1as J. Jones and Eva L. Jones, his wife, to the 
,, ... yo1ning corporation describes all of the "conflict 
area,'' excepting therefrom, however, Tract ''A.'' 
By separate quitclaim deed dated April 29, 1916, 
sho,vn at page 23 of plaintiffs' Exhibit "AA," Thomas 
J. Jones and Eva L. Jones, his wife, conveyed to the 
\\ ... yoming corporation Tract A (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A; 
Defendants' Exhibits 4 and 5 }. 
Defendants' located mining claims Lucky, Lucky 
Xo. 1, Lucky No. 2, Lucky No. 3 are situated in that 
part of the ''conflict area'' westerly of Tract A. There 
can be no dispute over the proposition that if Thomas 
J. Jones had no right, title, claim or interest in and to 
that part of the lode mineral deposit contained in the 
''conflict area" upon which defendants' claims are 
located, that his quitclaim to the Wyoming corporation, 
plaintiffs' predecessor in title, vested in the Wyoming 
corporation no right, title, claim or interest in the min-
eral deposit, and hence plaintiffs would have none (18 
C.J. Deeds, Sec. 264, p. 291 ; 16 Am. J ur. Deeds, Sec. 
326, p. 622; Patton on Titles, 1938, Sec. 122, p. 408). 
In this connection it should be specifically noted that 
in the prior litigation involving the "·conflict area" no 
decree of court has ever been entered which quieted th(-
title in the plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Company or 
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its predecessor in interest of the ''conflict area'' against 
Thomas J. Jones. The decree in the Circuit Court of the 
United States for the District of Utah, in Equity Action 
No. 522, entitled "Excelsior Iron Mining Company vs. 
Tho1nas J. Jones," (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "T") specifical-
ly quieted title in Thomas J. Jones in and to the ''conflict 
area." In the action instituted and prosecuted in the 
Circuit Court of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah by Excelsior Iron Mining Company vs. 
Thomas J. Jones, being Equity Action No. 1053 (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit "U"), although based upon stipulation of 
counsel (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "S "), nevertheless quieted 
title in Thomas J. Jones in the ''conflict area.'' The 
judgment entered in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, wherein Colorado Fuel & Iron Com-
pany was plaintiff and Excelsior Iron Mining Company 
was defendant, being Law Action No. 3,044 (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "X"), was an action based on -contract and did 
not attempt to quiet title in any person, firm or ·corpora-
tion. It adjudicated merely that there-. had been a sub-
stantial performance of the contract in litigation by the 
plaintiff therein named. Therefore, the conclusion 
seems irrefutable that if the plaintiff in this action, Ex-
celsior Iron Mining Company, has :any title in and to the 
mineral deposit in that part of the ' 'conflict area'' upon 
which defendants' mining claims are located, that such 
finding must depend upon Thomas J. Jones having such 
title as would lrave passed to plaintiffs' predecessor in 
title, the Wyoming corporation, by virtue of the quitclaim 
deed described above (P'· 23, Plaintiffs' Exhibit "AA"). 
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III. 
THE PATENT TO THOMAS J. JONES FROM 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DATED 
AUGUST 26, 1912 (STIPULATION R. 74, 75, 76) 
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED THE CONFLICT 
AREA, EXCEPT TRACT A, INSOFAR AS THE 
CORA NO. 1 LODE MINING CLAIM IS CON-
CERNED. 
The federal patent dated August 26, 1912, whereby 
the United States Government conveyed to Thomas J. 
Jones the Cora No. 1 lode mining claim, describes this 
claim by metes and bounds. The ,description of this 
claim a.s contained within the patent is delineate-d upon 
Exhibit "A" of the stipulation (R. 33) in heavy white 
lines. Commencing with corner No. 1 of the ·clain1, the 
description involves eight courses and eight ·corners. 
There is then contained within the description the pert-
inent exceptions which hereinbefore have heen set forth 
in this brief, but which for convenience are now repeated: 
''excepting and excluding from these presents all 
that portion of the ground, hereinbefore de-
scribed, embraced in said mining claim, or lot No. 
48 and said southwest quarter of the northwest 
quarter of Section thirty-two except tract A 
described as follows; Beginning at a point on 
line 8-1 of said Cora No. 1 lode claim west 281.1 
feet from corner No. 8; thence west 50 feet; 
thence South 11 degrees 30' West 126.2 feet; 
thence North 80 ·deg. 10' East 50.4 feet; thence 
North 11 degrees 30' East 124.6 feet to the 
place of beginning; and also all that portion of 
~~ 
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said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and all veins, 
lodes and ledges, throughout their entire depth, 
the tops' or apexes of which lie inside of such 
excluded ground ; Survey No. 4 797 extending 
1273.6 feet in length along said Cora No. 1 vein 
or lode; the premises herein granted, containing 
9.725 acres, more or less." (R. 27) 
In reading these exceptions, it is necessary to refer 
to the first course of the description of the lode mining 
claim, reading as follows: 
'' Thence, first course, south 11 o 30' west, 135.1 
feet intersect the south line of the Southwest 
quarter of the northwest quarter of Section 
thirty-two in Township t~rty-five South of Range 
twelve west of the Salt Lake Meridian, The 
Armstrong Placer Claim at South 88° 10' West 
570.5 feet from the .Southeast corner;. 434.8 feet 
intersect line 1-2 of lot No. 48, The Little Allie 
Lode Claim, at North 49° West 350 feet from 
·corner No. 2; 435.7 feet to corner No. 2, a cedar 
post four and one-half feet long, four inches 
square, marked 2-4 797 in mound of stone;'' 
(R. 27) 
The exceptions. first exclude from the conveyence 
all that portion of ground hereinafter described (being 
the description of the Cora No. llode mining claim) ''em-
braced in said mining cl!aim or Lot 48' '. The first ·course 
of the description above quoted referred to Lot 48, which 
is the Little Allie lode mining claim. This part of the 
excepted area embraced in the Little Allie lode mining 
claim is shown in pink upon the insert plat in this brief. 
This area consists of 5.002 acres (Stipulation Exhibit 
"D" and Defendants' Exhibit 3). The second exception 
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embraces all that part of the Cora No. 1lode mining claim 
included in the south,vest quarter of the northwest 
quarter of Section 32 aforementioned, except Tract A. 
Clearly this includes the ''conflict area'' which is situate 
in the said quarter section sho,vn in yellow on insert 
plat. This area excluded from the operative effect of the 
patent 1.571 la~res (Stipulation Exhibit "D"; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit '' 3'': R. 58). The area of Tract A is 0.141 acres 
(ibid.). 
The total area of Cora No. 1 lode mining claim as 
amended was 16.157 acres (ibid.). Subtracting from this 
total acreage the area of the Little Allie lode mining 
claim, or 5.002 acres, leaves 11.155 acres. The second 
excluded area equals 1.430 acres ( 1.571 acres total exclud-
ed area, less area of Tract A, .141 acres). Subtr:acting the 
net acreage of the second exclusion of 1.430 acres from 
11.155 acres leaves 9.725 acres, the exact area conveyed 
by the Cora No. 1 p•atent (Stipulation R. 27). This com-
putation removes any ambiguity (if any exists) in the 
Cora No. 1 patent to Jones, and proves beyond any 
question that the ' 'conflict area' ', except Tract A, was 
not patented to Jones. 
The course of the litigation which ensued and which 
has been particularly above described (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibits "S" "T" "U" "V" '' W" "X") clearly shows 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
that the Jones patent has been construed and interpreted 
by plaintiffs' predecessor in title, the \Vyoming corpora-
tion, as excluding the ''conflict area'' except Tract A. A 
strange situation is here presented. By plaintiffs' own 
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evidence its ·predecessor in title took the solemn legal 
position in a United States court (Exhibits 'V", "W", 
"X") that the patent to Jones excluded the "conflict 
area'' except Tract A and yet in this case the plaintiff 
E:x:celsior Iron Mining Company reverses the position 
which its immediate predecessor in title assumed (p 28, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "AA") and contends that this same 
patent conveyed to Jones the identical mineral rights 
which its predecessor in title on a 'Separate occasion 
contended oppositely. 
Supported by this record of l~tigation and by the of-
ficial computation of areas involved, the defendants as-
sert that Jones, by virtu,e of the federal patent, obtained 
no title to that part of the ''conflict area" occupied by 
defendants' locations, unless there is operative some 
rule of law applicable to this case that declares other-
Wise. 
IV. 
P'LA·T AND FIELD NOTES REFERRED TO 
IN PATENTS IS.SUED BY THE UNITED 
STATES MAY BE RESORTED TO· FO·R THE 
PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE LIMITS OF 
THE AREA THAT PASSED UNDER SUCH 
PA'TENT. THE PLAT WITH ALL ITS NOTES, 
LINES, DES.CRIPTIONS, AND LANDMARKS 
BECOMES AS SUCH A PART OF THE GRANT 
OR DEED BY WHICH THEY ARE CONVEYED 
AND CONTROLLED SO FAR AS LIMITS ARE 
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CONCERNED AS IF SUCH DESCRIPTIVE 
FEATURES WERE WRITTEN OUT IN THE 
PATENTS. 
Attached to the stipulation are the field notes and 
plats made by deputies of the United States Surveyor 
General in support of the Armstrong patent and of the 
Cora No. 1 patent. It is 'vell settled that a reference in 
a patent to the official plat and surveys make such plat 
and field notes of such survey 
''a part of the description of the land granted as 
fully as if they were incorporated at length in 
the patents." (U.S. Company vs. Larsen, 134 
Fed. 769, affd. 207 U.S. 1; 52 Law Ed. 65; 28 S. Ct. 
15) 
"The plat and field notes referred to in 
patents have been referred to frequently by the 
courts to determine matters of boundary. The 
question of a reference to the field notes f.or the 
purpose of construing the patent to a group of 
mining locations has not heretofore been resorted 
to. So far as we are advised we can see no reason 
why such reference may not be made. The real 
boundaries of the several conflicting locations 
may be determined only by a knowledge of the 
exclusions of the territory in conflict between 
them." (Round Mountain Mining Co. vs. Round 
Mountain Co., 36 Nev. 543; 138 Pac. 173, Rev. 
35 Nev. 392 ; 129 Pac. 309) 
''We are satisfied that evidence that the field 
notes, as the regulations of the department requir-
ed, showed marked posts at the third and fourth 
corners was admissible and that witnesses prop-
erly were allowed to testify that they found posts 
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upon the ground.'' (Silver King Coalition Mines 
Co. vs. Conkling Mining Co., 255 U. S. 151; '65 Law · 
Ed. ·561; 41 S. Ct. 310) 
'rhere can be, therefore, no question but wnat tne 
court is entitled to consider the field notes submitted 
by the defendants by way of the stipulation. These field 
notes conclusively p·rove the respective areas of the ori-
ginal Cora No. 1 lode mining claim, the Little Allie min-
ing claim, the ' 'conflicted :area' ' and Tract A. 
v. 
THE EVIDENCE C·ONCLUSIVELY SHOWS 
THAT THE SO-CALLED ARMSTRONG "IRON 
MINE" AND THE DEPOSIT OF ORE INVOLVED 
IN THIS ACTION IS A BLANKET OR HORI-
ZIO,NTAL VEIN HAVING NO APEX AND NO 
DIP. NO EXTRALATERAL RIGHT ATTACHES 
TO A HORIZONTAL OR BLANKET VEIN FOR 
THE REASON THAT SUCH A VEIN HAS NO 
"COURSE DOWNWARD" AS DESCRIBED IN 
THE FEDERAL STATUTE. SUCH VEIN THUS 
FORMS A TOP, AND WILL SUPPORT A VALID 
LOCATION· 
At the trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence cover-
ing exploration and development conducted by them on 
the mineral deposits involved in this action. Particular 
attention is invited to Plaintiffs' Exhibits "L" and 
'' M' '. Exhibit '' L'' demonstrates the cross-section of the 
Armstrong ore body, showing the p·robable structure as 
determined by diamond drilling. Exhibit "M" shows 
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cross-sections of the ore body looking northeast. These 
exhibits n1ust be kept. before the court in considering the 
testimony of ~lr. Earl F. Hanson and Mr. A. Lee Christ-
ensen, t"·o of the expert and professional witnesses pre-
sented by the plaintiffs at the trial. The pertinent parts 
of the testimony of these \vitnesses are hereinafter 
summarized. 
E.A.RL F. HANSON 
~Ir. Hanson is a mining engineer and geologist (R. 
107.) His professional \Vork since graduating from the 
University of Utah has been that of geologist (R. 107) 
and in particular he has acted in a consultant capacity 
"ith reference to the iron fields in southern Utah (R. 
108). In 1944 he was consulted regarding the titles to the 
mining properties of the Excelsior Iron Mining Com-
pany, plaintiff herein (R. 108). On September 15, 1944, 
he first entered upon the Armstrong "iron mine" (R. 
109). He described the deposit in the following manner: 
''A. The outcrop of the ore body which we call 
the Armstrong was very rough. The outline. was 
fairly regular, sort of elliptical but the ~outcrop ex-
tended high into the :air, as cliffs and boulders. and 
to get a picture of it one had to walk across over 
cliffs to examine it for its· apparent impurities; 
and it was easy to see the apatite crystals which 
contained phosphorus minerals. · 
Q. Would you hesitate long enough to trans-
late that for us, what you mean by apatite 
crystals? 
A. Apatite is a mineral containing phosphor-
us, and when }Jtresent in Iron ore in such quanti-
ties, say about thirty-five thousandths of one per 
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cent, makes it unsaleable, undesirable in the fur-
nace, and in the Iron Springs area it is the control-
ling factor, whether or not the material is ore, as 
much of it contains too much phosphorus to be 
marketable. And so my visit was largely to see 
by inspection whether or not this particular body 
looked like it could be mined and the ore sold. 
* * * * * 
A. The Armstrong outcrop is visible in almost 
any direction excepting from the west for a dis-
tance, a long distance, as it is the high point on 
the east face ~of the main range. , 
Q. When you say ''longdistance'', you mean 
in feet, or can you see it for several miles' 
A. Yes, sir, it is visible from Cedar City, a 
distance of more than ten miles. 
* * * * * 
A. A general examination of the Armstrong 
ore body, as I told you, indicates that it is a high 
phos ore body, and the Bureau of Mines sampling 
of the surface indicated that it was essentially 
high in phosphorus, but it is :a magnetite mineral, 
hard and desirable and that type of ore brings a 
slightly higher price than the softer ores. And it 
was decided to investigate more thoroughly than 
the Bureau of Mines had just what the actual con-
tent of this body to be. We thought surely some-
where there must· be ~some low phos-phosphorus 
ores there that might be mined.'' (R.l09-110, 112, 
114) 
Mr. Christensen described tihe exploration work con-
ducted by him in the Arm.strong ''iron mine'' commenc-
ing in the autumn of 1947 (R. 115 ). It consisted of wagon 
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drill holes and diamond drilling (R. 115). Wagon drill 
holes are shallo'v exploration holes ( R. 115). These holes 
are drilled normally to a depth of about 25 f·eet. The ap-
paratus used is portable and n1ounted on rubber tires 
and can be pulled over the surface and easily set up. The 
drill holes are usually located at 25-foot intervals in 
order to detennine variations in the grade of ore (R. 
116). The dian1ond drill is a rotary machine. It has a face 
of small diamonds, "~hich rotates and cuts a ·core which 
is held in the core barrel and can be removed. Diamond 
drilling produces an actual ore sample of the rock itself, 
which is used in analyzing the ore. By an examin~a~tion 
of the core from the diamond drill the nature of the 
n1aterial penetrated and the thickness of the stratum -can 
be determined (R. 116). A diamond drill can penetrate 
the earth for a limitless distance (R. 116). Ordinarily a 
hole is drilled through the ore body and into the formation 
beyond "'far enough to be sure that there isn't another 
occurrence of ore within a reasonable distance" (R. 116). 
Mr. Christensen had knowledge of the actual results of 
analyses of the diamond drill cores (R. 117). 
In 1948 the witness was employed by the Utah 
Construction Company, one of the ·plaintiffs (R. 
114), as a full-time geological engineer, and. at that time 
production operations of the Armstrong "iron mine", 
including the "conflict area", commenced (R. 117-121). 
While the "\vitness "\vas on the stand, the plaintiffs 
introduced in evidence a series of photographs marked 
Exhibits '' B" to "J' ', inclusive (R. 128, 136-137, 138, 139, 
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140). These photographs present views of the mineral 
deposit in the area of the Armstrong "iron mine" and 
of the "~conflict area". The witness was asked to describe 
the nature of this ore body. The following was his testi-
mony: 
''A. The ore body is a continuous mass with an 
outline as shown on the exhibit. It is somewhat U 
shaped, in that the east side dips to the west and 
the west side dips to the east. The ore is massive 
and continuous and made up largely of the min-
eral magnetite, and contains apatite, ~some quartz. 
Q. Does it have converging walls at depth f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is, the Wialls tend to come together at 
depth~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you say .as to whether that has the 
elements of a trough, that is, the walls~ 
A. Yes, it does have that trough shape. It has 
somewhat of 'a flat bottom to it." (R.128) 
Upon cross-examination the followin~ colloquy oc-
curred: 
Q. On the ·other hand, I take it from your ex-
perience, learning .and skill that you are able to 
form very definite opinions as to the geological 
conditions in that area. 
A. Yes, I have my own opinion regarding the 
geology. 
Q, You have heard Mr. Christensen's testi-
mony with respect to this deposit or trough. Do 
you agree with that' 
A. I do. 
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Q. I think I aJu quoting correctly, y-ou heard 
the testimony that it is trough in shape in the 
.ordinary sense of the word as you have used it, 
a hanging "~an, foot wall. Do you agree 'vith that f 
A. I do. 
Q. What would be your des-c:ription of this 
deposit! 
.A. I confirm Dr. Christensen's general des-
cription. 
Q. Well, then, I take it that the word "apex" 
in this kind of thing has no p~roper application. 
A. That is my understanding of an ore body 
which ·does not conform to planes. 
Q. In other words, you could not get"apex" 
out of this case~ That is your theory~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your opinion ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am using that, of course, in our general 
understanding of practical mining law, but of 
course this deposit would have strikes along the 
long axis, wouldn't it~ 
A. It has a long demension. When we define 
strike, it has reference to a plane and a dip to a 
plane. 
Q. You say that condition does not exist~ 
A. No sir, both sides of that are warped sur-
faces. They are not a plane, and they are inclined 
to be irregular. 
Q. Of course, I realize we are getting over into 
the field of hypothetical conditions. But on the 
other hand, I think it is a fair question to ask 
you, do you think this trough that existed some 
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tin1e in prehistoric times was either filled in by 
the ore deposit, or displacement~ How did the ore 
get in there~ I am sure we would all be interested 
. in your opinion. How did that produce that~ 
A. To quote from Dr. Mackay who has made 
a study of the Ir·on Springs and the Iron County 
ore deposits over a period of a number of years 
and his published account to the Utah State 
Geological Society, he sets it up something like 
this. That the ore probably came from the Mon-
zonite; that the Monzonite is in general form 
laccolith. 
Q. A wh.at~ 
A. A laccolith. 
Q. Would you spell that? 
A. It is l-a-c-c-o-1-i-th. A description of a 
laccolith is, a mass of igneous rock intruded into 
sedimentary rocks, arches the bed above a floor, 
leaving the sides flanked by sedimentary rocks 
dipping away from the igneous mass. 
Q. Now, what is that sedimentary rock~ How 
is it ·classified, if you know~ 
A. The sedimentary rock in this area are con-
sidered to be or' Pennsylvanian age, and they rep-
resent several formations, of which the Homestake 
limestone and the Pinto sandstone are two of the 
principal members. 
Q. You have heard Dr. Christensen say he 
didn't know of any Homes take limestone in this 
·area. Am I correct in that~ 
Q. I mean conflict area. 
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.\. I don't kno'v of any outcrops of Home-
stake limestone in the conflict area or near to it, the 
closest being Lindsay Hill. 
Q. How far a\Yay is thatv? 
A. That is at lea,st a quarter of a nrile. 
Q. '''ell, when you say a quarter of a mile 
away, doesn't that n1ean the Homes take limestone 
is displaced by the mineralized bodyo? Or is that 
an erroneous statement? 
A. Will you repeat the question again please 1 
Q. Was the Homes take limestone a quarter of 
a mile away from the disputed area displaced by 
the intrusion of the mineralized ore body, iron ore 
body? 
.. :\... I am afraid it will take considerable discus-
sion to bring out why there isn't Homestake lime-
stone present in the disputed area. It is not 
present. 
Q. And it ·has not been replaced Y 
A. No, it has not been rep~la.ced. 
Q. Well, if it didn't replace the Homestake 
limestone, how did it get there' 
A. It replaced the Pinto :sandstone, calcareous 
members within the Pinto sandstone. 
Q. Is that true a quarter of a mile 1away? 
A. No. The Lindsay ore body is distinctly ·dif-
ferent from the geological aspects. 
Q. I wish you would without being too elabor-
ate, just make a distinction between the disputed 
area and a quarter of a mile away. You say. there 
is a distinction between the two deposits. 
A. The first state, the minerals of the two 
deposits are different, the Armstrong ore body 
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being made up chiefly of magnetite, and the Lind-
say ore body being made up ·chiefly of hematite. 
Q. What is the difference between those two 
types~ " 
A. The difference as far as our considevation 
is concerned is mainly one of hardness, and the 
hematite being softer ore and the magnetic being 
the harder ore. 
Q. All right, of course there is a difference in 
the chemical composition. 
A. In the chemical composition. 
Q. You say in the disputed area it wa.s the 
Pinto sandstone that was displaced, is that right Y 
A. It is-I beg your pardon~ 
Q. Am I corre·ct on that~ Correct me, be-
cause I don't want to misquote you. 
A. Will you repeat the question 1 
Q. In the disputed area it was the Pinto sand-
stone that was displaced~ 
A. Replaced. I made the statement that the 
-Pinto sandstone was replaced. 
Q. Replaced by mineralized-by mineraliza-
tion~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How would that process occur! 
A. The mineralizing solution which probably 
came out of the Monzonite replaced molecule by 
molecule the adjacent country rock and left a de-
posit of magnetite. 
Q. Well, it wasn't a ·chemical process that took 
place then, such as the replacement that would 
take place in the limestone. 
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.-\.. I think it would be a parallel situation; in 
one case you have limestone replaced, in the other 
you have a calcarous sandstone. 
Q. ''rell, is that a chemical process1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \\:ell, then, it means that the sandstone 
'vould be dissolved, wouldn't it Y 
"'"-\.. That is a che1nical problem that would 
also take a lot of explanation to go into just how 
replacement takes place. 
Q. Suffice for our purpose-no need to take up 
the record-suffice for our purpose the Pinto 
sandstone is replaced by the mineralized body by 
chemical action in the disputed area. 
A. Yes, that appears. 
Q. Didn't that leave the hanging wall-the 
foot wall~ 
A. No, sir. If you take a lump of sugar and put 
a drop of water on it or a drop of ink, you might 
get an example of what might happen when min-
eralizing solution ·comes in contact with some-
thing it can react with. 
Q. Is that what occurred here? 
·A. In a similar way, I believe that is what oc-
curred. 
Q. Well now, is the silica in Pinto sandstone 
soluble in the sense the limestone is' 
A. Not soluble in the sense, but there are cal-
careous members-by ·calcareous, I mean contain-
ing lime-and a considerable proportion of lime, 
and those members are replaceable. 
Q. Is that what occurs? 
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Q. Well, do you have a predominance of the 
calcareous content above the ·sandstone, is that the 
idea? 
A. Yes, I would think the lime content there 
would be higher than the sulphur content. 
Q. When water comes in contact with that 7 
A. I don't follow you there, sir. 
Q. Well, what would bring about the dissolu-
tion, placing in solution the calcareous members 
of the sandstone, unles·s it would be waterY 
A. There are other ways of conveying miner.al 
than water. Water is only one way. It might be 
transported by gases; it might be actually ejected, 
in a sense, almost viscous materiaL 
Q. For our purpose then, either by water, or 
gases, or even acid ground_ water might have done 
it, is that correct! 
A. It was transported into this particular 
sedimentary bed. 
Q. Notwithstanding that f·act, it didn't leave 
the two walls, the hanging and the foot waJ.l, did 
it! In other words, ·simply the trough. 
A. It spread out where preparation had been 
made either due to fracturing or due to probably 
prefolding and naturally it would follow the line 
of least re·sistance. 
Q. Well, did it hit a fault line in there! Any 
evidence of faulting! 
A. Very little evidence of faulting. 
Q. It couldn't have gotten in the fault1 
A. Very little, there is some little peeling off 
on the easterly side against the :sandstone, but it 
does not represent a crushed zone such as a fault 
would be. And furthermore, the material forming 
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the east 'vall of sandstone looks exactly like some 
of the inclusions within the ore.'' 
A. LEE CHRISTENSEN 
:Jir. Christensen is a geologist and engineer, having 
received his Bachelor of Science degree in geological en-
gineering fron1 the lTniversity of Utah, his Master of 
Arts fron1 Stanford University in 1928, and his Doctor of 
Philosophy in geology from the University of California 
in 1942 (R. 14:2). He was employed by the Utah Construc-
tion Company, one of the plaintiffs in this action, in 1945 
as a geologist, although he had previously served this 
company in a consultant capacity (R. 142). In June, 1945, 
he commenced his investigation ·of the iron deposits in 
the Iron Springs mining district in Iron County, Utah 
(R.143). The witness prepared plaintiffs' Exhibit'' A''), 
being a compilation from maps in the United States 
Land Office :and it shows the Armstrong placer, the Arm-
strong ''iron mine'', Cora No. 1 lode, and the ''conflict 
area" (R. 144). The witness defined the "conflict area" 
as being an area measuring approximately 135 feet north 
and south and 600 feet east:and \Vest (R.145). In October, 
1947, the \vitness made a detailed investigation of the 
Armstrong ''iron mine'' ( R. 146, 14 7). As a part ·of the 
process there \Vere eleven wagon drill holes of an aver-
age depth of 30-35 feet, and on N.ovember 10, 1947, dia-
mond drilling began (R. 148). Six diamond drill holes 
of v:arying depth from 150 to 200 feet were made. In 
each case the aim was to drill completely through the ore 
body into the formation, either to the side or under-
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neath. These drill holes penetrated the ore body (R. 148, 
149.) The purpose of drilling the nineteen holes was to 
delineate and define the ore body (R. 149). On the basis 
of the information obtained from the drill holes, plain-
tiffs' Exhibit '' K'' ( R. 150) was prepared under the 
direction of the witness. This map shows the surface 
contours of the area and is related to a set of coordi-
nates described by the witness as follows: 
Q. What do you mean when you say a set of 
coordinates? 
A. Well, in the drilling we had to have some 
way of locating the drill holes, and we set up two 
sets of coordinates at right angles to each other. 
They were not north and south. They were rough-
ly northea'St-southwest and southeast-northwest. 
The reason for doing that was in preparing sec-
tions .of the structure and also in drilling for the 
'Structure, we aimed to get our sections at right 
angles to the ore body and the coordinates were 
laid out in that fashion.'' (R.150) 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit '' L'' was also· p~repared under 
the direction ,of Mr. Christensen (R. 151). Exhibit "L" is 
a ·Series of cross-sections taken at intervals of -approxi-
imately 100 feet !a,t right angles to the strike of the ore-
body. In the upper right-hand ~orner of the plat there 
is a figure underneath which is written "850 X". This 
refers to the arbitrary set of ·coordinates which had been 
established on Exhibit "K". The figure "750 X" on 
Exhibit "L" is a coordinate that is a distance northeast 
100 feet. The figure "650 X" is another coordin!ate an 
additional 100 feet distance. These figures on Exhibit 
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• • L" are the coordinate8 taken from Exhibit '~I(". There 
is a series of cross-sections at 100-foot intervals across 
the ore body. Five of these rross-sections are shown on 
Exhibit '· L' '. The first is 850 X and the last is 350 X-
500 feet are inYolved in this cross-section ( R. 152.) The 
cross-sections of. the ore body in the 4 'conflict area'' run 
obliquely across same. Tract A lies roughly between 
850 X and 750 X. In ref·erring to Exhibit ''L'' and cross-
section 850 X, the \vitness described the monzonite and 
sandstone depositions as follows : 
"A. Well, Monzonite is a rock strongly 
resembling granite and in ordinary appearance. 
And it is an intrusive rock which is believed form-
ed from a molten mass and crystallized :at some 
depth. 
Q. On the right-hand side of the section you 
have the space colored yellow and it says 'Sand-
stone'. 
A. That refers to a whitish or light tan or 
yellow sandstone material which in some cases is 
locally altered to quartzite. In other case'S it may 
be almost a white powder. It is extremely variable 
in texture. 
* * * * Q. Generally the Monzonite 1s to the west. 
A. Generally. You never find it east of the 
ore body. 
Q. Never east of the ore bed, and on the east 
of the sandstone. Now, what is the pink that lies 
between the Monzonite and the sandstone~ 
A. The pink is the ore body. 
Q. That is the ore body as it appeared in this 
outcrop and as it appears in this conflict area 1 
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A. It is. The shape of the ore body is inferred 
from the drill holes and the available surface in-
formation." (R.153, 154) . 
The witness deseribed in detail the method followed 
in demonstrating the size and shape of the ore deposit 
on Exhibits "L" and "M" by correlating the results 
produced by the drill holes (R. 155-157). Exhibit "L" 
shows the size and shape of the ore body -vvithout reference 
to mining operations and it was made some months prior 
to mining (R. 159). It wa~ a prelimin'ary estimate to in-
dicate the quantity of or~e which might be expected to be 
produced by open-cut methods. (R. 159). Exhibit ''M'' 
shows the extent of the orebody that is developed by 
actual mining operations (R. 160). A comparison of Ex-
hibit "M" with Exhibit "L" shows a close correspon-
dence, although there were differentations (R. 161, 162). 
The exhibits demonstrate that the ore body is bounded 
on the east by sandstone and on the west by either Mon-
zonite or s!andstone, and that it r~ests up·on sandstone 
( R. 162 ). The witness, as a mining geologist, character-
ized this ore body as follows : 
''A. Well, it could be described as roughly el-
liptical in shape, with its greatest extent northeast-
southwest. In cross sectional outline it is sort of 
a truncated V, you might say. In other words, our 
drilling has indicated that the bottom is flat or 
gently sloping and as you actually observe it has 
a series .of sections, the depth varies from place 
to place. It has a somewhat irregular bottom. 
Q. Is it fair to say that the isides which enclose 
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Q. Throughout its length! 
... \. Throughout its length, that is character-
istic. 
Q. So that the sides consisting of sandstone 
and Monzonite form a trough within which this 
body of ore lies, is that right¥ 
A. Yes, a trough 'vith rather irregular bottom, 
and generally fla.t or gently sloping. 
Q. What is the greatest width .of the ore body 7 
A. Oh-
A. (sic) I didn't mean in feet, but with rela-
ti{)n to the top or bottom, where is the greatest 
width1 
A. The greatest width is at the top·. 
Q. So that this ore body as it lies between 
those converging sides is wider at the outcrop or 
top than it is at depth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And ,does the width diminish generally, as 
both sides go down! 
A. The width in all cases diminishes. There 
are no overhanging contacts, as far as we have 
found." (R.162, 163) 
Cross-examination of this witness produced the fol-
lowing pertinent and relevant statements: 
'' Q. * * * All right, now, from the descrip-
tions on Exhibits M and L, is this typ~ical exhibit 
-was there a typical ore body that· possessed an 
apex! 
A. I would think not. 
Q. I wish you would elaborate that statement, 
it is interesting. 
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A. I would describe it roughly as elliptical 
body, sort of a V shape, with an irregular flat 
or gently sloping bottom which varies somewhat 
in elevation as you go along the land. It is more 
of a trough~ 
Q. It has a definite strike, however, hasn't it? 
A. Well, it has a greater length than-that is, 
it is elliptical and you can say its greatest length 
is the ·strike, but it doesn't have a strike as you 
ordinarily discuss with veins or bedded sediments. 
It doesn't have a qefinite plane surface. Neither 
of the contacts, or I wouldn't say· any of the con-
tacts, you can't refer to just two, there is a bottom 
to it, also, but none of them can be described as 
plane surfaces, although the southeast has a gen-
eral plane surface in some places, but as you map 
and as you follow along·in the mining there are 
changes, curves, or swells. 
Q. You, of course, referred to U. S. G. S. 
Survey Bulletin 338. 
A. You mean the one by Leath and Harter~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. In describing that ore body did they des-
cribe it in ·different terms of strikes and dips? 
A. Well, I would say this with due respect to 
both Leath and Harter. The investigation was 
made a long time ago; they didn't have any of the 
available evidence that we have now; and with 
transportation what it was, I think they did a good 
job, but certainly their conclusions could be modi-
fied. I would not accept the conclusions as they 
drew them in that bulletin, no. 
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Q. And you won't accept them, Mr. Christen-
sen, I :assume, because ·of your research and work 
in diamond-wagon wheel and diamond drilling? 
A. Well, we made it a point-it is a little dif-
ferent when you are just writing about something; 
but when you write on it and people are going to 
spend son1e money mining it, you have to be fair-
ly sure of your conclusions. And although I was 
aware Qf both the work of the Bureau of Mines 
and the earlier w.ork of the U. S. Geological Sur .. 
vey, and I accepted their conclusions with an open 
mind, nevertheless, when I found facts which 
changed my opinion I had to be realistic about 
them; I had to take the facts as I found them. 
Q. Those facts as you say you found them, 
they disagree with the early U.S.G.S. description~ 
A. Yes, they differ materially with the-even 
the recent exploration of the U. S. Bureau of 
Mines. For one thing, in both of those explora-
tions they ·show Monzonite in contact with the ore 
throughout the length, while there is a v-ery con-
siderable body of sandstone that is easily recog-
nized. 
Q. Y.ou mentioned that where it comes in from 
the northwest, did you~ 
A. Toward the northeast. 
Q. It croS'ses over the ore body, does it~ 
A. No, it goes parallel with it. 
Q. Well, it produces the condition of putting 
the sandst·one between the ore body and the Mon-
zonite! 
A. Yes, it sort of wedges out; it is, you might 
say, a lense shaped body running essentially 
parallel "\\rith the ore body but toward the south-
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west end it pinches out and the Monzonite there 
comes in direct contact with the ore. 
Q. Well, then, would you say that this deposit 
had any dip to it, the way you have described it? 
A. No. 
Q. You used the word ''dip''. 
A. No, I didn't,-you can refer to the slope of 
the walls ·and you ·sometimes use it as the term dip 
in a rough sort of way, I might have mentioned 
that in my previous testimony, but I don't think 
that that ore body has a well defined strike or dip. 
I don't think it is a plane surface. 
Q. Well, now, is that eonfining your remarks 
to this here, would you call this a vein In a 
classical sense? 
A. No. 
Q. You wouldn't 7 
A. No, I would not. 
MR. PAuL H. RAY: Cla:ssical1 
MR. RITER : Yes. 
Q. Class it between a hanging and a foot wall t 
A. I would refer to it as a replacement type 
of ore body. Now it is true that in the ·district, 
with this one exception, nearly all the other ore 
deposits are in limestone, which is much more 
readily replaced ch·emically than this one is, but 
this has all the .other fe~atures that go with it. You 
can find fragments of the unreplaced country rock 
in the ore itself. We found a number of ·cases of 
that in the diamond drilling, and there is 'Some 
apparent in the wall as you see it on the north .. 
west face. You can still see some ·of those masses 
of unreplaced country rock. In its form, general 
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character, I \vould ·say that this ore body has a 
strong re'Semblance to the others, in th·a.t they are, 
you might say, elongated pods. 
Q. N O\V, I want to ask you this. Isn't the 
Homestake limestone definitely replaced by the 
ore body, and it has a. f.oot wall and hanging wallY 
MR. ''r· \Y·. RAY: In this Y 
:JIR. RITER : In this. 
A. I don't think the Homes take is in it: I 
don't think it is anY"! here around it. 
Q. Are you sure about that, is that your state-
ment! 
A. I have never found any easily recognized 
limestone. There is quite a little calcareous sand-
stone, but any of this material found in this vicini-
ty has no resemblance to the typical Home-stake 
limestone. There may be pods or areas, lenses of 
limestone, but I would not put this in with the 
Homestake limestone. 
Q. Then your theory of this mineralized 
trough deposition is replacement~ 
A. I would call it replacement, yes. 
Q. Then you think the trough primarily ex-
isted through the function of nature, it was filled 
in some time by the mineralized deposit, is that 
y·our theory1 
A. Well, I can't say very much about how it 
was formed. I can say pretty much what I think it 
is, what its form is. But :any supposition you make 
on how it was f.ormed is pure inference. Nobody 
was there when it happened 
Q. The trough as you have explained that, is 
there. Now, in y·our cross s·ection, the thing stands 
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out, has irregularities, you come down to 750 and 
.. the 350, it looks as if it is lying in a trough, doesn't 
it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it a reasonable or unreasonable inference 
to believe that that trough existed and was filled 
in~ 
A. No I don't think it is. I don't know what 
that trough was. 
Q. Well, wasn't, as a rna tter of fact, the lime-
~stone replaced by the iron~ Isn't that reasonably 
certain 7 
A. Well, I don't know why you would say 
limestone if there is no evidence of it now. In 
nearly all the other ·cases where we have had lime-
stone replace it by iron, we found ·evidence of the 
limestone itself. 
Q. Well now, you have indicated 750X as the 
cross section within the disputed area. 
A. Well, the disputed area would lie roughly 
between 850 :and 750 X. 
Q. And 750. 
A. As I remember they run oblique. 
Q. Now, !want you to state, between those two 
cross sections is there any type of ore deposit to 
the east' 
A. I would say definitely not. If you are going 
to have strike 'and dip you have got to have a 
definite pJane formed of the ore body which this 
doesn't have. 
Q. Because of the trough formation, is that 
the sequence of your statement?· 
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A. VVhen I \vent into this thing I was open 
1ninded about \vhat its shape might be. I had no 
particular conclusion whether it was a vein or 
whether it was a trough or what it was. I went 
in purely to find out what its shape might be so 
that 've could determine the outline of the pit and 
if possible 1nineable ore and the shape as I have 
developed it is based largely on connecting points 
of the kno,Yn composition or elevation. Now, in 
this case, on 850-
Q. Exhibit what 1 
A. Exhibit M. I also refer back here. In this , , 
case 850--
Q. Exhibit L? 
-L<\.. Exhibit L. I had the ·contact between the 
Monzonite and the ore. That was readily apparent. 
It was sharp enough that you could actually 
straddle it and have o.ne foot on one material and 
one on the other. So this location wasn't any parti-
cular place. We knew from drill hole No. 6 which 
was entirely ore, the ore extended .down at least 
that far. We knew that from Bureau of Mines 
drill hole No. 18, that it extended down to the 
points indicated on the map--that is the color, and 
I prolonged with a dotted line the known outcrop, 
missing drill hole No. 6 which was entirely in ore, 
and coming down to the intersection on the 
Bureau of Mines hole 18. In the same way I con-
nected these points. Now, actually that shape may 
vary considera.bly. We found when we mine these 
things they don't come out exactly as plane sur-
faces. Rather they are undulated. And in the same 
way I connected the outcrop on the southeast side 
where there was a rather marked cliff and the 
S'an.dstone contact or point we found there in drill 
hole No. 5 where there was a sudden change from 
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the ore to the ·sandstone. When you talk about the 
dip of the ore body, I don't think you can refer to 
it that way, because it has· no plane shape, that 
is when you refer to strike and dip you refer to a 
plane surface, or something is bound-
Q. You are really talking in geometrical 
terms, :aren't you? 
A. Yes. Now, in this case you can put in a lot 
of hypothetical structures here about the sand-
stone, but actually when you get out in the field 
'that sandstone is s-o shattered ~hat you can't tell 
which is bedded, you can 't-in other words, you 
can't mark this as a strike. 
Q. What I want to know from you, referring 
.back to Exhibit A, where do you place this ore 
body-is it on the purported Lucky location~ It 
isn't, is it 7 (R. 172-178) 
A. The Lu·cky location falls within it, yes. 
On redirect examination, Dr. Christensen testified 
that the defendants' locations !and also Tract A lie on 
one homogeneous ore body (R. 180), and upon recross-
examination the following ~colloquy occurred: 
'' Q. Well, it is true, Mr. Christensen, that this 
ore body itself ha:s, as you said, no dip to it, isn't 
it a matter of fact that it does, let's use the word 
slop~e, to the east and southeast~ That is what my 
question of the high point of deposit was 1aimed at. 
MR. PAUL H. RAY: Upon the surface~ 
MR. RITER : No, as disclosed by his research. 
MR. PAUL H. RAY: Surface slopes, the surface? 
MR. RITER : Yes. 
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A. The surface, yes, slopes to the-
Q. Well, is that true of the ·ore body itself? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, it demonstrates it-doesn't it show 
that very definitely on the exhibits by these cross 
sections. Perhaps I am wrong, correct me if I am. 
A. Those are taken at certain various points. 
Actually it is a trough somewhat like this. 
Q. Yes. 
A. With a bottom that varies from pl:ace to 
place. In other words, it comes down here and 
made a depression and down here and made a 
depression. 
Q. Well, wouldn't the ore body itself ·on Lucky 
No. 3 be lower in elevation than on the Lucky~ 
MR. PAUL H. RAY: You mean on the surface~ 
MR. RITER : On the surface. 
Q. On the surface, that is true. 
A. That the ground itself in each case-the 
slope of the .ore on the surface, is toward the 
southeast. 
Q. Well, you say the slope of the ore on the 
surface. Why wouldn't that be true of the slope 
of the ore when you get into the interior~ 
A. Well, because what you have is an irregu-
lar mass which has been trunca.ted by erosion so 
that I don't think you could say the ore has any 
particular slope." (R.l80-182) 
1. The court committed prejudicial error in 
finding that the apex of the mineral deposit was 
within Tract A and in attaching to Tract A extra-
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lateral rights. That part of Finding 19 which 
declares that the discovery within Tract A lies upon 
the apex of the lode or vein is not supported by 
substantial evidence, but is in contradiction of 
plaintiffs' own evidence. Conclusions of Law 1 and 
2 erroneously apply the law of ·extralateral rights 
to said deposit. 
Germane to the discussion that follows is the follow-
ing Federal statutory enactments: 
''Mining claims upon veins or lodes -of quartz 
or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, cin-
nabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable 
deposits, located p~rior to May 10, 1872, shall .be 
governed as to length ~along the vein or lode by 
the customs, regulations, and laws in force at 
the date of their location. A mining claim located 
after the lOth day of May 1872, whether located 
by one or more persons, may equal, but shall 
not exceed, one thousand five hundred feet in 
length ralong the vein or lode, but no location of 
a mining claim shall be made until the dis·covery 
of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim 
located. No claim shall extend more than three 
hundred feet on each side .of the middle of the vein 
at the surface, nor :shall any ~claim be limited by · 
· any mining regulation to less than twenty-five 
feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the 
surface, except where adverse rights existing on 
the lOth day of May 1872 render such limitation 
necessary. The end lines of each claim shall be 
parallel to each other. R.S. § 2320. '' (U.S.C.A., 
Title 30, Sec. 23) 
"The locators of :all mining locations made on 
any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the 
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public domain, their heirs and assigns, where no 
adverse claim existed on the lOth day of May 
1872 so long as they comply with the laws of the 
United States, and with State, territorial, :and 
local regulations not in conflict with the laws of 
the United States governing their possessory title, 
shall have the exclusive right of possession and 
enjoyment of all the surface included Within the 
lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, 
and ledg"es throughout their enti:r~e depth, the 
top or apex of which lies inside of such surface 
lines extended down"\vard vertically, although 
such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart 
from a perpendicular in their course downward 
as to extend outside the vertical side lines of 
such surface locations. But their right of posses-
sion to such outside parts of such veins or ledges 
shall be confined to such portions thereof as lie 
between vertical planes drawn downward as above 
described, through the end lines of their loea tions, 
so continued in their own direction that such 
planes will intersect such exterior p·arts of such 
veins or ledges. Nothing in this section shall 
authoriz.e the locator or possessor of a vein or 
lode which extends in its downward course beyond 
the vertical lines ·of his claim to enter upon the 
surface of a claim owned or possessed by another. 
R.S. § 2322. '' (U. S. C. A., Title 30, Sec. 26) 
' 'Claims usually called 'placers,' including 
all forms of deposit, e~cepting veins of quartz, 
or other rock in place, shall be subject to entry 
and patent, under like circumstances and -c-on-
ditions, an·d upon similar proceedings, as are 
provided for vein or lode ·claims but where the 
lands have been previously surveyed by the 
United States, the entry in its exterior limits 
shall conform to the legal subdivisions of the 
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public lands. And where placer claims are upon 
surveyed lands, and ·Conform to legal subdivisions, 
no further survey ·Or plat shall be required, and 
all placer-mining claims located after the lOth 
day of May 1872, shall conform as near as p·racti-
cable wit;h the United States system of public-
land surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions 
of such surveys, and no such location shall include 
more than twenty acres for each individual claim-
ant; but where placer claims cannot be conformed 
to legal subdivisions, survey and p1at shall be 
made as on unsurveyed lands ; and where by the 
segregation of mineral land in any legal sub-
division a quantity of agricultural land less than 
forty :acres remains, such fractional portion of 
agricultural land may be entered by any party 
qualified by law, for homestead purposes. R.S. 
§§ 2329, 2331; Mar. 3, 1891, c. 561, § 4, 26 Stat. 
1097. (U.S.C.A., Title 30, Sec. 35) 
''Where the same person, association, or 
corporation is in possession of a placer claim, 
and also a vein or lode included within the 
bowndaries ther.eof; application shall be made for 
a patent for the placer .claim, with the state-
ment that it includes such vein or lode, and in 
such case a patent shall issue for the placer claim, 
subject to the provisions of sections 21-24, 26-30, 
33-48, 50-52, 71-76 of this title, including such 
vein or lode, upon the payment of $5 per acre 
for such vein or lode claim, and twenty-five feet 
of surface on each side thereof. The remainder 
of the placer claim, or :any placer claim not em-
bracing any vein or lode claim, shall be paid for 
at the rate ·of $2.50 per acre, together with all 
costs of proceedings ; and wher.e a vein or lode, 
such as is described in section 23 of this title, is 
known to exist within the boundaries of a p~lacer 
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cl(J;int, an application. for a patent for such placer 
clain~ which does not include an .application for 
the ·rein or lode claim shall be construed as a con-
clusive declara.tion that the claimant of the placer 
claim has no right of possession of the vein or 
lode cla-im; but where the existence of .a vein or 
lode in a place1· cla·i1n is not known, a patent for 
the placer claim shall convey all valuable mineral 
and other deposits within the boUJndaries the.reof. 
R.S. § 2333. (U.S.C.A., Title 30, Sec. 37. 
Emphasis supplied.) 
The testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, Hanson and 
Christensen, discloses and proves that the mineral 
deposit here involved is not a conventional vein or lode 
between a hanging wall and foot wall. These witnesses 
were emphatic that it has no dip or strike and tliat it 
is ·without an apex. It is a body of ore located within 
a truncated trough. Mr. Hanson testified that the ore 
body does not conform to planes a:nd that there is no 
apex involved in the deposit. Without planes there can 
be no aiJ~ex, is a fact asserted by this witness in response 
to :several questions. 
Likewise, Dr. Christensen testified that it is a body 
of ore elliptical in sh!a1pe with its greatest extent north-
east and southwest, an·d with its greatest width at the top. 
Dr. Christensen emphasized the fact that it possesses no 
apex and has no dip. While it is a consolidated body of 
ore and is one deposit, it represents a subterranean 
intrusion which the forces of na,ture laid down from the 
process of replacing sandstone with mineralized ele-
Inents. The form and extent of the deposit are demon-
strated on plaintiffs' Exhibit "K", "L" and "M." 
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It is the contention of the defendants that this de-
posit is a blanket or horizontal or bedded deposit of ·ore 
and that the law of ·extralateral rights under Section 
26, Title 30, U. S. C. A. (R. S. ~ 2322) cannot be applied 
to same. The following quotation, taken from American 
Mining Law by A. H. Ricketts of the San Francisco Bar, 
printed in February 1943, under the dire·ction of the 
Division of Mines, D·epartment of Natur.al Resources of 
the State of California, elucidates the position of de-
fendants in this case. 
''Blanket vein or horizontal, or bedded, is a 
term applicable to ta hosizontal vein or deposit 
which may have no distinct apex. The apex of such 
vein is regarded as coextensive with the space be-
tween the side lines, -and every ·part or point of 
such apex as much the middle of the vein as any 
other part. A bl:anket vein is one where the ore 
body covers the entire area within the limits of 
the side and end lines of the location. The right to 
an entire vein or lode can not be asserted under 
a location covering a part only of its width, and 
the location is only good f.or the part within the 
lines extended vertically downmard. A blanket 
vein or lode has no extralateral rights but should, 
however, be located as a lode ·claim. '' ( § 145, 
p. 122) 
Mr. Lindley, in his discussion of "broad lodes" con-
tained in his monumental Treatise on American Mining 
Law, Third Edition, makes the following revelant state-
ment. 
''Before leaving the subject of 'broad lodes' 
it may be well to call attention to certain classes 
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of deposits which in their occurrence 1are 'broad, ' 
and by reason of being in place 1nay fall within 
the definition -of 'lodes,' but 'vhich at the same 
time may not be susceptible of being carved up 
into numerous surface locations upon which extra-
lateral rights may be predicated. We may take, 
for example, ,,·hat are familiarly .called the 'cop-
per porphyries,' zones of impregnation, replace-
ment, or secondary enrichment caused by denu-
dation and leaching. These zones cover large 
areas, sometimes a mile or more in length by a 
width of a thousand or n1ore feet. At times they 
are :surrounded by rocks of different character. 
But their boundaries, so far as mineralization 
is concerned, are, generally speaking, -commer-
cial ones, on all sides, top and bottom. Zones 
of this character have no dip or downwar'd 
course, in a legal sense. Nor hawe they an apex, ex-
cept, perhaps, theoretically, such as the land de-
partment for executive purposes establishes in the 
case of blanket deposits. The mineral-bearing rock 
is homogeneous throughout, it is true. But to ap-
ply the extralateral right doctrine of bisected 
apex and 'broad lode'S' to this character of de-
posits would be an .absurdity. 
''As was said by the supreme court of Utah in 
the case of Grand Central Min. Co. v. Mammoth 
M. Co.:-
'What constitutes a discovery that will 
validate a location is !a very different thing 
from what constitutes an apex, to which at-
taches the statutory right to invade the pos-
session of and apprOJ}riate the property 
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''For the purpose of sustaining the V!alidity of 
a location or patent of land ·containing this cla·ss 
of deposits, an apex may be presumed. But it does 
not follow that an extralateral right may be predi-
cated upon the presumption. In most of the sul-
phide copper districts vertical planes have been 
established by agreement or common understand-
ing. If, technically speaking, an extralateral right 
could be legally predicated in this class of de-
posits, the 'common l!aw' of the district would un-
doubtedly follow the precedent set by Leadville in 
dealing with the blanket deposits of that region, 
resulting practically in the denial of extralateral 
rights.'' (Vol. II, § 583, pp. 1319-1321. Emphasi~s 
supplied.) 
The situation here involved has been brought to the 
attention of the courts on seVieral occasions wherein the 
question of the exercise of extralateral rights bas arisen. 
The case of Duggan et al. v. Davey et al. (4 Dak.110; 
26 N.W. Rep. 887) pr·esents a situation wherein the court 
was called upon to determine whether or not an apex 
existed within the exterior surface boundaries of the 
def.endants' mining location. This case announces the 
rule that while a blanket or horizontal vein has no extra-
lateral rights, it should be located as a lode claim, and that 
the owner of a claim that h!as no apex ·cannot exercise 
extralateral rights conf·erred by the Federal statute. Mr. 
Lindley comments on this case at length in his Treatise 
(I. Lindley on Mines, § 310, p. 689.) He states: 
"It is one of the few cases which affords a full 
opportunity of explaining by simple methods the 
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true definition of the term 'top,' or 'ap·ex,' as well 
as the 'strike' and' dip,' and their relationship one 
to the other.'' 
The case of Gilpin v. Sierra Nevada Consolidated 
Min. Co. (2 Idaho 696; 23 Pac. 547) clearly den1onstrates 
that the law of extralateral rights has no application with 
respect to a blanket or horizontal vein. The court said: 
'' * • • But the plaintiff also urges that, 
\v·herever the apex of this vein may be, or if it 
have no apex at all, but is simply a blanket vein, 
if its apex be not between the defendant's side 
lines, the defendant has no right to follow .it into 
the plaintiff's grounds, ·Or within the boundaries 
of the claims of which the plaintiff is in posses-
sion. That is a proper construction of the law. The 
defendant's right to that ore, if he have such 
right, must be based solely· upon the fact that the 
vein has its apex within its own 'side lines.'' 
This case again announces the ·doctrine that · the 
absence of an apex in a claim ·destroys extralateral rights. 
Mr. Lindley, in reviewing this case in I. Lindley on Mines, 
§ 310, p. 696, writes: 
'' * * * The supreme court of Idaho reversed 
the order [of the lower court denying an injunc-
tion] and directed an injunction principally on the· 
ground that the location of the Sierra Nevada did 
not cover the ap~ex, and that the showing made did 
not justify or authorize its presence underneath 
the plaintiff's surface.'' 
Ban Francisco Chemical Co. v. Duffield (201 Fed. 
830) (8th Cir.) also holds that a blanket vein is subject 
to location as a lode claim although it has no apex. The 
case definitely recognizes the existence of blanket veins. 
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In Duffield_ ·et aJ, v. San Francisco Chemical Co. (205 
Fed .. 480) the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that a zone of calcium phosphate is a lode 
within the rnining laws and not a placer claim. It wrote: 
'' • • • And a vein or lode is in place within 
the meaning of the -statute when it is inclosed in 
a general mass of what is known as country 
rock, that general bed of the country which 
remains in its original state unaffected by th• 
action of the elements." (p. 484) 
This decision reverses that of the trial court in 198 
Fed. 942. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in its 
decision in the cas~e of Iron Silver Mining Company v. 
Mike and Starr ·Gold and Silver Mining Company (143 
U.S. 394; 36 Law Ed. 201; 12 S. Ct. 543) is an important 
authority in this inquiry. The follo'Ying excerpt is 
pertinent: 
'' * • * The fact is, there was an earnest in-
quiry * * * whether, in view of the disclosures 
made in this, as in prior eases, of the existence of 
a body of mineral underlying a large area of 
·country in the Leadville mining district, whose 
general horizontal direction, together with the 
sedimentary character of the superior rock, in-
dicated something more of the n1ature of a de .. 
posit like a coal bed than of the vertical and 
descending fissure vein, in which silver and gold 
are ordinarily found, it did not become necessary 
to hold that the only pr·ovisions of the ,statute 
under which title to any portion of this body of 
mineral, 9r the ground in which it is situ!ated, can 
.be acquired, are those with respect to placer 
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claims. Of course, such conclusions W·ould have 
compelled a revising of some former opinions, 
and have wrought great changes in the status of 
mining claims in th·a.t district. Because ·of this we 
have been very careful, and the investigations 
in these directions have been earnest and pro-
tracted. * • * It is enough to announce the re-
sults. * * * that the title to portions of this 
horizontal vein or deposit, 'blanket' vein 1a.s it is 
generally called, may be acquired under the sec-
tions concerning veins, lodes, etc. The fact that 
so many patents have been obtained under these · 
sections, and th~a~t so many applications for pat-
ents are still pending, is a strong reason against 
a new and contrary ruling.'' (pp. 399~400) 
The following quotation is taken fr.om the opinion 
of the Idaho supreme court in Stewart Mining Co. v. 
Ontario Mining Co. et al. (23 Idaho 724; 132 Pac. 787): 
'' Ap·pellant lays great stress on the words 
'downward course', as employed in the statute 
(section 2322), and counsel. have ~devoted many 
pages of their brief to a discussion of the authori-
ties which treat of this subject. In this stat-
ute the words 'downward course' and 'course 
downwar·d' are used interch~ngeably, and it 
was undoubtedly intended by the use of the 
words to signify the course of the vein 
from the surface toward the center of the 
earth. Som·etimes it may happen that the 'down-
ward course' of a vein will be perpendicular 
!and the vein will form a vertical plane, but, as 
a rule, there is a deflection in the downward 
course of these mineral veins from the perpen-
dicular, and we ·call this their dip; but still the 
course of the dip is always 'downward,' and, 
when the plane of the vein reaches the hori-
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zontal, then we have a blanket vein or lode, ~and 
on such a vein a locator has no extralateral 
right. Costigan, Mining Laws, 414, and authori-
ties there cited. See 1 Lindley, §§ 300, 311.'' 
(p. 792) . 
In Morrison's ·Mining Rights, 15th Edition, at page 
206, the author comments on Duggan v. Davey (supra), 
Stewart Co. v. Ontario Go. (supra) and Gilpin v. Sierra 
Nevada {Supra): 
"In the case of Duggan v. D{]),vey, 4 Dak. 
110, 26 N. W. 901, 17 M. R. 59, the top of the 
lode was exposed by erosion and the erosion 
extended downward where the side or edge of 
the v-ein was exposed a:s it extended into the 
earth ~on its dip of about 8 degrees. The Sitting 
Bull Survey was laid upon this lateral outcrop 
and sought to ·enjoin the claim below· it. The 
Court found as !a matter of fact that the out-
crop of the vein on which the Sitting Bull was 
patented was the exposure of its lateral edge 
and not of its top or true apex and that it was 
therefore not entitled to extralateral rights. 
((Stewart ·Go. v. Ontario Co., 23 Ida. 724, 
132 P. 787, is a very similar case. It also decides 
in terms the point stated in the next paragraph 
-that a blanket vein has no extralater!al rights. 
"The case of Gil!prin v. Sie,rra Nevada Co., 2 
Ida. 696, 23 P. 547, 17 M. R. 310, intimates that 
blanket veins can not claim to h!a,ve an apex 
under the Mining Acts. The inclines on the 
deposit in that instance as worked ran from 
the surface up, instead of down. 
''In the Leadville and Aspen ca.ses arising 
upon veins of the ·character last !above described, 
in the United States Circuit Court at Denver, 
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any such distinetion as above 111ade has not been 
recognized. But the strict ruling on other points, 
that there· should have been no prior location 
on the dip; that the apex location must be made 
on 'a vein in place, and the necessity of having the 
apex parallel to the side, and not parallel to the 
end lines, which is a practical impossibility when 
the real deposit is a deeply imbedded field, bed 
or basin, with a more or less circular rim, have 
circumscribed and practically defeated most at-
tempts to follow such veins on their dip. 
~~The strength· of our contention is increased 
by an attempt to apply the apex law to such 
deposits as the lead and zinc beds. at Joplin, 
niissouri. There the country for miles is under-
laid by a stratum carrying zinc and le'ad ore. 
The miner ·starts =a shaft in the open prairie, 
without any indications whatever of mineral, and 
at ·a certain depth confidently expects to pierce 
this ore-bearing stratum, which is substantially 
a flat underlying dep·osit, the outcrop ·of which 
may be miles distant-if it have .any ·outcrop at 
all it is only when s-ome bluff or ravine would 
expose the edge of the bed at the surface. As to 
such deposits it is obvious that there is no such 
thing ·as locating a claim so many feet on e!ach 
side of the center of the vein, for, a:s the Depart-
ment holds: 'The apex of the lode is ·co-extensive 
with the side lines. '-29 L. D. 689. In I ron 8. 
·Co. v. M. & 8. Co., 143 U. S. 394, 36 L. Ed. 201, 12 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 543, 17 M. R. 436, the opinion refers 
to this distinction and reeognizes the validity 
of such blanket lode locations, treating this inci-
dent of no apex proper as an item of minor im-
portance. Blanket veins mu·st be located as lode 
claims and not as placers.-Iron 8. Co. v. Camp-. 
bell, 17 Colo. 27 4, 29 P. 513. '' (pp. 206, 207) 
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The early case of McCormick v. Varnes, found in 
40 Pac. S. Rep. 355, although decided under the Act of 
Congress of July 26, 1866, contains the following com-
ment which is relevant under the 1872 statute: 
"Under the rules of the common law, he would 
only be ·entitled to wbatever might be ov.er and 
under the surface of a segment of the earth, 
carved out by the exterior lines of the location 
extended downwards indefinitely. Sections two 
and four, of the act referred to, furnish the ()nly 
qualification or enlargement of the common law 
right by which miners hold their claims, and 
that is to this extent only, that they may follow 
the lode from the apex found within the ·surface 
ground, on its dip to any depth, although in its 
·course downward it may so far depart from 
a perpendicular as to enter the land adjoini~g. 
This must necessarily be beyond the side lines of 
the location, because under ·all laws the end lines 
form a bulwark beyond which the miner may not 
· go. But he cannot go beyond or outside of his 
side lines on the course or strike of the vein, it 
is only on its dip· that this may be done.'' (pp. 
362-363) 
Reference is made to Whildin v. M.aryland Gold 
Quartz Mining Go., (33 Cal. Ap~p. 270; 164 Pac. 908) 
wherein this language is used: 
''There :a:ve certain expressions, also, in some 
of the decisions of the courts that lend ·color to 
the contention that title to the lode independent 
of the :surface boundari~es may ·be oa·cquired, but 
they are not to be t1aken as laying down the law 
in the premis·es. '' 
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This decision holds that a pa.tent covering a portion of 
the lode lying beyond the exterior boundaries of the 
claim is invalid. 
1lfontana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. Con-
sol. Copper d; Silver 1llin. Co., (20 Mont. 336; 51 Pac. 
159) declares : 
"* • * "While it is true that the surface of 
mining ground is often spoken of in the decisions 
of the courts as an incident to the vein whose 
apex lies within or under it, we are clearly of the 
opinion that the mining statutes of the United 
States contain no authority for the conveyance 
of the lodes or veins embraced in a located quartz 
claim independently of the ·surface ground con-
nected with and containing or overlying them. 
~ • * The patent conveys an area ·of 2.98 ·acres 
and no more. * * * In so far as the patent attempts 
to convey the Blarus lode on its strike, independ-
ently of the granted surface of 2.98 acres, it is 
void and of no effect.'' (pp. 160, 161) 
Of particular importance to the present defendants' 
claim that the patent to Jones of Tract A carried with 
it no ti tie to the remaining part of the ''conflicting area,'' 
or the mineral ~eposit therein, the following extensive 
quotation from State v. District Court (25 Mont. 504, 
572; 65 Pac. 1020) is pertinent: -
"* * * Suppos·e, for instance, there had been 
no vacant surface within the boundaries of the 
Copper Trust location, would it be contended 
for a moment that 0 'Connor has any rights what-
ever under it? A discovery of ~a vein upon unoc-
cupied land is ·absolutely essential to the validity 
of a location. There must be a ·surface right. 
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Without this no right to the lode can be estab-
lished. The statutes do not authorize the land 
·department to ·convey a lode independently of 
the surface ground connected with and contain-
ing or overlying it. This is the conclusion stated 
by this court in Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. 
Boston & M. C:onsol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., 
20 Mont. 337, 51 P:ac. 159, in a case in which the 
plaintiff claimed under a patent which attempted 
to ·convey a small portion of surface covered by 
the Barns location, together with 1,318 linear 
feet of the lode, which had its apex in, and under-
lay the surface of, the Johnston, a conflicting 
claim. The patent was held to be unauthorized 
and void as to the portion .of the ledge not under-
lying the ~surface conveyed by it. This court 
said: 'It is no doubt true that those :statutes, 
taken ~as a whole, give greater prominence verb-
·ally to the lode ·or vein than to the surface con-
nected therewith; but this naturally results from 
the fact that the lode is the main subject treated. 
Such expressions and such prominence, how-
ever, cannot avail to permit the grant of lodes 
or veins embraced in 1a located quartz claim, 
regardless of the 'surface connected therewith.' 
T·he same view is stated by Mr. Lindley in his 
work on Mines, in :section 780. It is only by virtue 
of an ap,ex found within the surface of any claim 
h·aving p~arallel end lines than .an owner may 
!assert the right to enter beneath the surface ~of 
his n'eighbor. This is the evident meaning of 
section 2322 of the United States Statutes. Neither 
this section nor any other provision of the statute 
authorizes or provides a way for the appropria-
tion of any portion ·of .a lode without .some portion 
of the :surface thr·ough which it may be reached. 
Should a p:atent issue to 0 'Connor, under the Del 
Monte !and Hidee Cases it would issue for the 
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whole surface within the Copper Trust bound-
aries, excluding all those portions covered by the 
relators' patents. Under the principle of the 
case of Montana Ore-Pu·rcha.sing Oo. v. Boston 
& ~- C·onsol. Copper & Silver Min. Co., supra, 
and as stated by Mr. Lindley, this would ipso 
facto exclude the ore bodies lying within the dis-
puted triangle. Again, the title to 1a mining 
claim carries with it all the rights incident to a 
title in fee at the common law, except in so far 
as it is enlarged or limited by the ·statute. This 
court, in Copper Co. v. H·einze, 25 Mont.-, 64 
Pac., at page 329, in .considering such rights, 
said: 'The patent grants the fee, n·ot to the sur-
face and ledge only, but to th·e land containing 
the apex {)f the ledge. The right to follow the 
ledge upon its dip between the vertical planes of 
the parallel end lines extending in their own direc-
tion, when it departs beyond the vertical planes 
of the side lines, is an expansion of the rights 
which would be conferred by a ·common-law g:r.ant. 
On the other hand, this grant is :subject to the 
right of an adjoining locator to follow his vein 
upon its course downward beneath the surface 
included in the grant. In these two resp·ects only 
do the rights conferred by the .statute differ from 
those held under a ·common-law grant.' There-
fore, viewed merely -as land with the ordinary 
incidents of ownership, the OWiller holds every-
thing beneath the surface, subject only to the right 
-of an adjoining loeator or patentee, who _has the 
apex of a vein, and who has eomp·lied with the 
statute, to pursue it on its dip beneath the surface. 
0 'Connor has no part of the apex of the vein so 
·situated with reference to the ore bodies within 
the triangle that he may pursue the vein from 
the .surface. He cannot a.cqurire any portion of 
the surface belonging to the relators. N·eith~r 
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~can he pass through the St. Lawrence from the 
point at which he made his ·discovery, or from any 
point within 1any of the surface owned by him. 
He is therefore not in a positi~on, by virtue of 
his location, to maintain his ·claim to the ores in 
·controversy. Under the principle of Copper Co. 
v. Heinze, :supra, and upon the undisputed facts 
presented upon this application, they belong 
prima facie to the relators, .as owners of the Rob 
Roy claim, and others to the ~south by virtue of 
their common-law rights.'' (pp. 1025, 1026) 
The Supreme Court of Nevada, in Golden Fleece Co. 
v. Cable Con. Co. (12 Nev. 329) wrote thus: 
"Under that law (of 1872) it ~annot be doubted 
that it (plaintiff) is bound by the lines of its 
surface claim in favor of the subsequent locator. 
It is true that the vein is the principal thing 
and the surface but an incident thereto; but it 
is also true that the mining law has ·provided 
~no means ·of locating a vein except by defining 
a surface claim including the croppings or point 
at which the vein was exposed, and the part of 
the vein located is determined by reference to 
the lines of the surface claim. These lines ·are 
fixed by the m·onuments in the ground, and they 
cannot be changed so as to interfere with other 
'Claims subsequently located.'' 
Gleeson v. llfartin White Min. Go. (13 Nev. 456) 
contains this comment: 
''Sound policy, therefore, concurs with the 
language :of the st·atute in sustaining our con-
clusion that a vein can only be located by means 
of a surface claim. '' 
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In Harper v. Hill (159 C·al. 250; 113 Pac. 162) the 
Supren1e Court of Calif.ornia cited the Golden Fleece 
and Gleeson cases and then commented as follows: 
''These observations were made with refer-
ence to the rights of subsequent locators of 
adjoining ground against ~changes in the lines 
attempted by the first locators. But the point of 
the decision is that the rights of the parties are 
fixed by the lines marked ·on the ground when 
the location is made.'' (p. 166) 
Appellants particularly emphasize their contenti10n 
that part of Finding 19, to wit, "the discovery within 
Tract A lies upon the apex of said lode or vein,'' is not 
only not -supported ·by substantial evi~dence, but is a 
finding in complete contradiction to plaintiffs' own 
evidence. The plaintiffs' witnes'Ses, Hanson an·d _Chris-
tens·en, repeatedly testified that this ore deposit has no 
apex, strike or dip, but that it is a deposit within a trun-
cated trough. In the face of this evide'nce coming from 
the plaintiffs, it is difficult to discover the reas:on the 
trial court made this finding. In this :connection, atten-
tion is invited to Finding 11: 
'' S·aid ore body was, prior to its being mined 
·by the plaintiffs a body -of ir'on-be-aring rock in 
place ·embedded in a trough-like impression with 
its walls converging as they descend.'' 
By this finding the court ~ollowed the evidence of Han-
son and Christensen; but in making that p.art of the 
finding contained in Finding 19, to which the defendants 
object, the court departed from the evidence of these 
witnesse'S and, in fact, denied it. The evidence without 
79 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contradiction therefore proved that the deposit is a 
blanket or horizontal deposit which h.as no apex. 
Conclusions of Law 1 and 2, to which objection is 
made by app·ellants, are the product ·Of the erroneous 
part of Finding 19 and deny -authoritative mining deci-
'Sions. The authorities herein cite·d announce the rule 
that .a lode claim without an apex cannot e~e~cise extna-
lateral rights. Since this is ·a blanket or horwontal 
deposit, Mr. Lindley teaches us that no extralateral 
rights -attach. Again to qu·ote him: 
''To apply the extralateral right doctrine of 
bisected apex and 'broad lodes' to this character 
of deposits would be an absurdity." (supra) 
Appellants respe·ctfully submit that this error is of 
such substantial nature :as to require a nullification ·of 
the judgment in this action. 
2. .The patent to Tract A granted to Jones 
title only to that part of the mineral deposit within 
the exterior boundary lines of Tract A and not to 
any part of the deposit in the ''conflict area" upon 
which appellants' claims are located. 
If the extralateral · right .doctrin·e he dis·carded, as 
appellants believe it ;should be, then plaintiffs !are forced 
to the po.sitiori of as.serting that the conveyance of that 
part of the blanket or horizontal deposit specifieally 
des·cribed in the patent as Tr.act A gives title to the 
whole deposit in the ''~conflict area.'' Such position is 
wholly untenable un,der R.S. 2322 (U.S.C.A., Title 30, § 
26) which declares that a patentee "shall have the ex-
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elusive right of p~ossession and enj-oyment of all the 
surface included within the lines of their location ~and 
of all veins, lodes or ledges thfloughou t their en tire 
depth, the top ·or apex {)f which lies inside of such :sur-
face lines extended downward ve·rtically • • * '' 
It is n1a.nifest that under this 'statute and the 
authorities hereinbefore cited, the right of a lode patentee 
to mineral deposits exterior to the lines of the patented 
area is dependent solely upon the existence of an apex 
being inside of the surface lines of the patented area. 
Therefore, Jones' title to that p·art ·Of the mineral 
deposit exterior to the lines of Tract A is solely depend-
ent upon the existence of an apex within Tract A. Jones' 
patent to Tract A conferred upon him and his grantees 
no title to the mineral deposit exterior to the limits 
thereof, except ·as might arise through the operation of 
the extralateral rights doctrine. The ·authoritie's here-
tofore cited clearly sustain this proposition. It would 
therefore appear that ·On this faeet of the case plaintiffs' 
rights to that part of the mineral deposit contained 
within the area of defendants' locations must ~stand or 
fall on the proposition that the apex of the deposit is 
contained within Tract A and that the deposit dips to 
the west. They .cannot ·claim that ~although there is no 
apex in Tract A the patent to Tr·act A convey·ed title 
to the reinaining part of the mineral deposit in the''con-
flict area. ' ' 
3. With respect to the exercise of extralateral 
rights, the patent in favor of J,ones covering Tract 
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A created no conclusive presumption as to the 
existence of an apex within its boundaries. 
There is a suggestion in the record of trial of this 
action that the patent to J,ones of Tract A established 
a ·Conclusive presumption thla~t the ap·ex of the mineral 
de-posit exists therein ·and that in the present action 
~defendants are ha.rred from collaterally attacking this 
presumption. Appellants recogniz·e the e"Stablished rule 
of law that la patent cannot be ·collaterally atta-cked on 
account of any question which the Land Department 
can lawfully determine before issuing the patent (Davis 
v. Weibbold, 139 U.S. 507, 35 Law Ed. 238, 11 S. Ct. 
628; Steel v. St. Louis Smelting and Ref. Co., 106 U.S. 
44 7 ; 27 Law Ed. 226; 1 S. Ct. 389). This rule is :subject 
to an important excep·tion. Mr. Lindley comments on 
this ·exception ~as follows (Ill Lindley on Mines, § 780, 
p. 1900): 
''We have ·always been of the opinion, and we 
think it supported by the weight of authority, 
that in justifying his presence underneath 
foreign territory the .apex claimant is not aided 
.by ·any presumptions of fact flowing from the 
patent with regard to the position of the :a.pex 
:and its ·course through the ·claim; that the con-
clusive presumption as to the validity of the 
patent is confined to the surface area and its 
vertical bounding pJanes, that is, to its intra-
limital rights, which are subject to a right of 
inv;asion only by an ·outside a.pex p;roprietor-
a right reserved by l'aw and express·ed ·in the 
patent. In other words, a lode patent does not 
~aise ·any presumpt~on in ju1stification of the 
invasion of ·another's territory, as to the position 
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of the apex or the course 'Of the vein, but th·ese 
facts, when challenged by the proprietor of the 
invaded claim, should be proved by the apex 
claimant, regardless of presumptions. flowing 
from the patent. The circuit court of app~e~als. of 
the eighth circuit, in the caJse of Work Mining 
and Milling Company v. Doctor Jack P.ot Mining 
Co., [194 Fed. 620; 114 C.C.A. 392] challenges 
this vie,Y, and is sponsor for a doctrine which 
gives presmnptive effect to the p~atent as to the 
existence of these basic facts. * * * '' 
Mr. Lindley then ·p·roceeds to ·analyze .and discuss the 
Doctor Jack P~ot casie 'and con·clude'S that it was indigen-
ous to the state law ~of Colorado requiring the 'sinking 
of a discovery shaft which must disclose the 1crevice or 
vern. He then writes: 
"* * * There:f5ore, patent having been is'sued, 
~such vein must be conclusively presumed to :exist 
in the 'shaft. If this he the ·correct rule, it follows 
that the force of ~a federal patent issued for a 
lode claim in a state having a discovery ishaft law 
is much more potential than the .sam'e kind of ~a 
patent would be in a state having no such law, 
e. g., California ·and Utah. In other words, the 
Oali£ornia and Utah apex ·Claimant must prove 
the ·situ'S and cou:vS'e of his :apex when his rights 
are challenged by an outside proprietor whose 
territory is invaded, while in c.o1or·ado ·and other 
·states similarly situated the burden tshifts to the 
latter to show that the .ap·ex of the vein cros,se's 
the ·side lines, and this is the only def'ense a~ail­
able to him. 
''Another 'sugge!stion we think quite pertinent 
finds expression in the decision of the supreme 
court of Utah, in the case of Grand Central 
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Mining Company v. M~ammoth Mining Company. 
* "" *" (29 Utah 490, 83 Pac. 648, 677. Ibid. § 
780, p. 1905) 
At this point Mr. Lindley quotes the ex~cerpt from 
the Gr.and Central ca;se heretofore ·set forth in this brief, 
and then concludes with this ·statement: 
''For administrative purposes the land depart-
ment ·necess-arily ~as~sume's that the course of the 
vein is lengthwise of the claim, but this ·does not 
signify that when the patent once issues there is 
'a presumption that :such is the f,act. If the doe-
trine of the circuit court tOf appeals in the case 
under ·consideration should be applied to the flat 
deposits found in ·Leadville, or in the Black Hills 
·of South D~akota, or to the copper 1sulphide zones 
of N ev:ada and Arizona, or in the phosphate 
regions of Idaho ~and Wyoming, all of which 
must be patented under the lode laws, as the 
deposits are essentially in place, the production 
of a patent presuming an apex extending length-
wiS'e of the claim would take the entire sweep 
of the deposit, 'Since it would be impossible for 
the defendant to p]}ove that the vein crosts~ed the 
side-lines of plaintiff's claim. 
* * * * * 
"It seems to the author that the rational 
solution of the difficulty is not to consider the 
rule, which requires the ap,ex claimant to justify 
hi1s presence in :Doreign territory by 1Showing the 
position ~and ,eourse of hi'S ~apex, as an attack on 
the p:atent, but r~ather an inquiry as to what was 
gr.anted by the p~atent outside of its vertical 
boun~daries. 
''In support of the validity of the patent 
as it affe.cts !and conveys intralimital rights, 
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such patent may be given conclusive effect. But 
when atten1pts are m:ade to assert rights which 
are extrala teral, the exercise of which must be 
predicated on the existence of physical f~acts, 
rather than presun1ptions, it would see1n the 
party asserting the extralateral rights should 
be compelled to prove the racts. 
* :j(t * * * 
''With the highest res·pect f~or the opinion of 
the eighth circuit court of appeals, we feel that 
its ·opinion in the "Vork-Doctor Jack Pot case 
asserts a ·doctrine that will not receive the s·anc-
tion .of the supreme court of the United States.'' 
(Ibid. § 780, pp. 1907-9) . 
Mr. MorriS'on, in his ''Mining Rights,'' 15th Edition, 
comments on the Doctor Jack Pot case as follows: 
"That there was no vein in fact in the dis-
covery cut, it would seem to ns· ought to be prov-
able when such assumed vein i's being use·d ~as a 
basis for claiming ·and fixing extr.alateral rights. 
If it may be shown that the ~discovery vein leaves 
its· ~side line, it seems a fortiori that 1a p·arty would 
be rallowed to 1ShOW that there w.as no vein there 
to follow to either end or 'side line. This would 
not- in the least .overthrow the· rule that the dis-
covery cannot be impeached for the purpose of 
defeating the patent as a muniment of title. But 
the decision being affirmed in the Circuit Co11rt 
of Appeals, 194 F. '620, 114 C. C. A. 392, settles 
the point !adversely to our contention until pa1ssed 
on by the Supreme Court and so we yield .to 
authority, our reason abiding unconvinced. '' (p. 
216) 
The case of Golden v. Murphy (31 Nev. 395; 103 Pac. 
394, 406) contains the following pertinent comment: 
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'' • • • What may .constitute a sufficient dis-
covery to war~ant ~a location of ~a claim may be 
wholly inadeqUJate to justify the 1oca.tor in claim-
ing or exercising any rights re1served by the sta-
tutes. What constitutes a discovery that will 
Vialidate a location i!s 'a very different thing 
from what .constitutes a;n 'apex, to which attaches 
the 'Statutory right to invade th:e posse~ssion of 
and ·appropriate the property which is presumed 
to belong to an 'adjoining owner. The question of 
a sufficient discovery ~of ,a vein, or of the validity 
of a notice of location, upon which the cases cited 
by the ;appellant on this point ·are .authority, is 
'Substantially different from one relating to the 
continuity of a vein on its dip from the apex, and 
which tests the rights of the undisputed owner 
of the jsurfa·ce to what lies underneath and within 
his own boundaries. It is the object and policy 
of the law to encourage the prospector and miner 
in their efforts to dis·cover the hidden tre~asures 
of the mountains, and there£ore, ·as between con-
flicting lode claimants, the law is liberally con-
strued in fa~or of the senior location; but, where 
one claims· what prima facie belongs to hi·s 
neighbor, because of an apex in the claimant's 
location, a more rigid rule of construction against 
the claim,ant prevails, and, tas we have already 
observed, 'he has the bu:vden to :show, not merely 
th·at the vein on its dip may include the ore hodies 
in the adjoining ground, but that in faet it does 
-'so include them. Until he establishes such fact 
beyond rea1sonable ·Controversy he has no rights 
outside his side lines in lanother''S ground. 'In 
determining what .constitutes su·ch a discovery 
a;s will satisfy the law .and form the basis of a 
v,alid mining location, we find, as in the case of 
the definition of the terms "lode" or "vein" 
that the tendency of the ·courts is toward marked 
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liberality of construction where a question :aris~s 
between two miners who have located claims 
upon the same lode, or within the same surface 
boundaries, ·and tow~ard ·strict rules of interpreta-
tion when the miner asserts rights in property 
which either prima f.acie belongs to .s·ome one 
else, or is claimed under laws other thlan those 
providing f.or the disposition of mineral lands, 
in which latter case the relative value :of the tract 
is a matter directly in i·ssue. The reason for this 
is ·obvious. In the case where two miners· assert 
rights based upon separate alleged dis~coverie's 
on the s~ame vein neither is hamp·ered ·with pre-
sumptions arising from ~a pri!or grant of the 
tract, .to overcome which strict proof is required. 
In applying a liberal role to one cl·ass of cases 
and a rigid rule to another the courts justify their 
action upon the theory that the object of each · 
section :of the Revised Statutes, and the whole 
policy of the entire law, should not be overlooked.' 
1 Lindley ·on Mines (2d Ed.) § 336. The Supreme 
Court of Montana, in Fitzger,ald v. Clark, 17 
Mont. 100, 42 Pac. 273, 30 L. R. A. 803, 52 Am. 
St. Rep. 665, observed: 'When it i1s ~s.aid that 
a location may be BU'stained by the discovery of 
mineral deposits of such Vlalue as to 'at least 
justify- the explor.ation of the lode in the expecta-
- tion of finding ore sufficiently valuiable to work, 
it is a very different question f:vom telling a jury 
that the geological fact of the continuity of the 
vein to a ·certain point may be determined by what 
a practical miner might do in looking for ~some 
hoped-for continuity.' Migeon v. M1ont. Cent. 
Ry. Co., 77 Fed. 249, 23 C. C. A. 156; Bonner v. 
Meikle (C. C.) 82 Fed. 697; United States v. 
Iron Silver Min. Co., 128 U. S. 673, 9 Sup·. Ct. 
195, 32 L. Ed. 571. '' 
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The case of Grand Central Min. ·Co. v. Mammoth 
Min. Co. (Utah), frequently cite·d he-rein, declares: 
"We concede, ~as c1aime·d by the appellant, 
that a p.atent to .a mining ·claim raises a con-
clusive presumption :that there is the apex of 'a 
vein within the patented ground (1 Lindley ·on 
Mines~ § 305) ; but .there is no presumption that 
it is -the apex of the vein in ·dispute, and such 
presumption 'applies equally to the Silveropolis 
and Consort mining claims 'as to lot 38, and 
does not shift the burden of proof in this ·case 
as to the ·apex land .continuity of the vein and ore 
in con tl"oversy. '' ( 83 P:ae. 668) 
Plaintiffs !affirmatively disproved the existence of 
an apex in Tract A or in any part of the deposit. In the 
face of this p:rtoof, it hardly is consistent for them to rely 
upon the theory the patent to T:vact A ~aise'S ~a conclusive 
pre'sumption as to the existence of 1an apex therein. If 
they desired to rely upon any such pre~sumption (which 
in ·appellants' opinion reliable authorities deny), then 
the intr·oduetion in evidence of the Jones' patent would 
have made their case. They proceeded, however, by 
their ~own evi•dence, to prove the non-existence ·of an 
apex or dip in T:vact A or in iany part 10f the deposit. 
Stated ·otherwise, by their own action they totally demol-
ished the p·resumption, if .any existed. Unle'ss they are 
prepared to dis:avow their own evidence, it is· difficult 
to see how they ·can t'Orture !any presumption .as to the 
existence of an 'apex on Tract A from the issuance of 
the patent ,covering s·ame. 
Aside, however, from plaintiff's' proof th,at no apex, 
strike or dip exists :on Tract A or 1any p·art of the deposit, 
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defendants assert that the issuance of the Jones p!a,tent 
created n<> presumption--eonclu'Sive or otherwi~se-that 
an apex exists in Tract A ·as found by the c·ourt. This 
was a fact to be proved at trial 'and pl~aintiffs themselves 
successfully disproved it. 
VI 
THE PATENT ISSUED TO WALKER AND 
BLAIR COVERING THE ARMSTRONG PLACER 
CLAIM AND THE ARMSTRONG "IRON MINE" 
INCLUDED NO PART OF THE MINERAL DE-
POSIT, EXCLUDING PLACER RIGHTS, SITU-
ATE IN THE "CONFLICT AREA." 
By reference to the Armstrong p!atent (Sipulation; 
R. 22-25) it is manifest that the ·description of the Arm-
strong ''iron mine'' does not extend the same into the 
''conflict ·area.'' Taking the paten~ on its £ace, the south 
line of the ''iron mine'' was located 'approximately 135 
feet north of the ·south line of the Armstrong placer 
claim. Hereinbefore it has been explained that Mr. 
Dickert, the deputy miner:al surveyor, did n·o~ extend the 
lode location to the south line of the pla·cer claim because 
he was mistaken as to the location of this ·S'outh line. 
Instead of being coincident with this· s·outh line, the 
s·outh line of the lode claim w~s about 135 feet north of 
it. The descrip·tion of the ''iron mine'' gives its 
acreage as 1.36 of an acre more or less, and then 
proceeds with the declaration ''that .three hundred 
ninety-six (396) linear feet of the 'Armstrong' iron 
1nine designated by the Surveyor General as lot number 
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forty-one (41) ·and 'according to 'the return on file in 
the general land office bounded, ·de·scribed land platted 
as follows with Magnetic Variation a.t fifteen degrees 
(15°), thirty-two minutes (32') east.'' There then follows 
a description of the iron mine by metes an'd bounds, ·and 
this de1scription makes the northeasterly-southwesterly 
direction 396 feet, and the easterly-westerly direction 
210 feet. The ·de·scription therefore definitely limits the 
gT~ant. Beyond dispute, such grant did not describe •any 
part ·of the mineral deposit within the ''conflict area.'' 
1. The law of ·extralateral rights cannot be 
applied to follow a vein along its strike. 
If it be assumed that the Armstrong mine has a strike 
along its· southwe!sterly-northeaJsterly ·axis, such .assump-
tion will yield nothing to the plaintiffs. They ;cannot as-
se·rt extralateT~al rights along the 'strike of ·a vein or lode. 
The early Utah case of McCormick v. Varnes, hereinbe-
fore ·cited, fixes the law on that point. Other authorities 
hereinbefore quoted likewise sustain this aoctrine, 
among which Montana Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & 
M. Cons. Copper and Silver Mining Co., supra, elabo-
rates this rule. It is not believed that there will be any 
serious denial of the rule here asserted that the plain-
tiffsi cannot claim ownership of that part of the deposit 
in the '' ·confli;ct area'' by virtue of the extralateral 
right doctrine. 
2. The grant of the Armstrong "iron mine" 
in the Walker-Blair patent specifically fixed its 
limits and there can be no implication that there 
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'vas patented that part of the deposit within the 
"conflict area." 
... \.ppellant~ adurit that \Yith referenee to the judg-
Iuents in Equity Cases 522 ·and 1053 in the Circuit Court 
of the United States for the District of Utah (Exhibits 
'· S ", "T" and "U "), hereinbef·ore mentioned, that as 
to these appellants the doctrine of res ·adjudicata is not 
available inasmuch as they are third party claimants !and 
"\vere not parties or privies to these actions. ·On the other 
hand, the decision of Judge l\Iarshall in the first men-
tioned equity action is certainly authority which may be 
quoted by appellants to sustain the ·contention herein 
made. Appellants have obtained from the files of this 
case in the office of the Clerk of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah, a copy of Judge 
Marshall's opinion in the case. Judge Marshall wrote 
as follows: 
'' 1}he surface lines adopted by him [the 
locator] limit his right to .the vein to the same 
extent if he had only a lode location. He ha'S the 
opportunity to develop the course of his lode, ·and 
must suffer the consequence of a failure to do so. 
To the extent the vein is not covered his ·applica-
tion for p·atent is a conclusive declaration that he 
'has no right to it. When the s~tatute was en,acted 
the generally accepted facts of vein occurrence 
were of .course known to Congress. It must have 
been ~assumed that in ground which .could be 
properly located as placer, surnace indications· of 
veins would be infrequent 1and of limited extent; 
that where ·a vein was known to exist in a placer 
the knowledge would extend to but ·a 'Small part 
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of the vein if the p·1acer ·claimant was· to reap 
an advantage by failing to explore it. The higher 
price for the lode WJa.s intended to dis,courage .a 
monopoly of the more valuable deposit (Reyn-
olds v. Iron Sil. M. Co., 116 U.S. '687, 695)." 
T,he opinion in Montana Ore-Purchasing ·Co. v. Bos-
ton & M. Cons. Copper and Silver Min. Co. holds that 
the grant of a lode location within a placer claim is 
confined to a ·description of the lode in the patent and 
that the gr1ant was void in its attempt to include ano;ther 
part of the lode outside of the ·spe·cific area des•cribed. 
Let Mr. Lindley summarize the matter. 
''A lode patent conveys:-
'' ( 1) The exclusive right of possession and 
enjoyment ·of all the surface included within ,the 
limits ·of the location, as described in the patent, 
subject only to pre-existing easements; 
'' ( 2) All veins, lodes, and ledges throughout 
;their entire depth, .the ·top·s, or apices, ·of which 
lie within the boundaries, the right to pursue 
the vein in depth outside of such boundaries 
·being limited, however, to ·cases where the lines 
of the location and the physical conditions with 
respe·ct to ·the lode are such as are outlined in 
the chapter on extra1ateral rights; 
"(3) Prima facie, such a patent confers the 
right to everything f.ound within vertical planes 
·d:rrawn through the surface ,boundaries; but the·se 
boundaries may be invaded by an outside lode 
locator holding the ·ap~ex of 'a vein under a ·regu-
lar valid location, in ·the pursuit of his vein ·on 
its~ downward ·cour:se underneath the patented 
-surface. How the prima facie presumption may 
be overcome, .and on whom rests the bur.den of 
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proof, will be diseus·sed when dealing with the 
action of trespass and the rule·s of evidence 
applicable to such action. 
• • • • • 
· · _..-\_~ under the existing law, the appropria-
tion of the vein is ·accomplished by locating a 
surface including it, the locator can obtain no 
more in length than is included within the limits 
of the surface boundaries, and the mere call in 
the survey and patent for so many feet of the 
lode is of no moment. If. a patentee is granted 
fifteen hundred linear feet on a vein, he will 
obtain that much, if so much is found within his 
surface boundaries. If there is less, if the vein 
does not traverse the full length of his cl·aim, 
but passes out of -a side-line, ·the patentee may 
not follow it outside of these boundaries on the 
strike. T·here is no reason for perpetuating the 
early theories followed by the land department 
as to lode patents under the act of 1866. There 
is no necessity for inserting in the patent the 
number of linear feet granted. The patent is 
certainly not conclusive evidence of the physical 
existence of a lode .to any continuous extent. 
The issuance of a lode patent conclusively pre-
sumes the existence within its boundaries of ·an 
apex, as this is .a f;act necessary to ;support its 
validity, ·but it will not be p~resumed ~that this 
apex takes any particular direction or extends 
for ·any ·definite length. The course of the lode 
as indicated by the hypothetical lode line exhibi.ted 
by ·the surveyor concludes no one. 
''The patent will only convey so much of the 
lode as has its apex within the boundaries, and 
the call for length in the patent is useless." 
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Attention is invited to rthe provisions of R.S. 2333 
(U.S.C.A., Title 30, § 37) covering the issuance of a 
patent to a lode claim contained wit}rin !a placer claim 
which in part provides : 
" * * * an application for a .patent for such 
placer claim which does not include an applica-
~tion for the vein or lode ·claim ·s·hall be construed 
as a conclusive ·declaration that the claimant of 
the placer claim has no right of possession of 
the vein or lode claim. • • • '' 
Under ~this quoted provision of the s·tatute, it has been 
definitely adjudicated that if a placer claimant does 
not apply for a patent to 1a known lode claim at the 
time he applies for a patent to ·the pl,acer cl·aim, that 
he conclusively foreswears ~all right to the lode claim. 
(Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike and Starr Gold and 
Silver Mining ·Co., sup·ra; Reynolds v. Iron 8. M. Co., 
116 U.S. 687, 29 Law Ed. 77 4, '6 S. Ct. 601 ; II Lindley 
on Mines, 3d Ed., § 413, p. 963) 
The :a:ction of Armstrong in applying for a patent 
to the ''iron mine'' within the placer claim conclusively 
-shows th~at he had knowle·dge ·Of the existence of the 
lode ·claim at the time he applied for the placer patent. 
By his application and the patent which w·as issued 
thereon, the measurements of the lode ·claim were defi-
nitely fixed. He there£,ore ·conclusively declared that 
he bJa.d no right in the miner,al deposit exterior to the 
lines of his lode loeation and cl~aim. If a f.ailure of a 
placer claimant to in·clude in his placer application an 
application for a known lode in toto ~cuts off his right 
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to clain1 the lode, it seen1s logically to follow thJat his 
specific delineation of the part of the lode claimed by 
him excludes any p·art of the. mineral deposit not in-
cluded in his lode claim although the same may be situ·ate 
within his placer location. Judge Marshall, in his opin-
ion to which reference is above made, ·confirms this 
principle in the following 1angu:age: 
''To the extent the vein is not covered. in 
'IDS application for patent is a conclusive dec-
laration that he has no right to it.'' (See quoted 
excerpt supra.) 
SPECIAL NOTE 
Finding No. 18 is to the effect that the pl~aintiff 
Excelsior Iron Mining Company is the owner of the 
en tire ''conflict area'' including the entire •sur~ace 
thereof ·and all the ores and minerals lying upon or 
within said :area. Conclusion of Law No. 4 declares 
th!at on April 30, 1949 the area embr·aced within the 
four Lucky locations was not open to location under 
the mining laws of the United. States or the State of 
Utah, by the defendants or anyone else. Such ~area 
was not public domain but each and every part thereof, 
together with all the mine~als lying upon or. therein, 
WJas and is the property of plaintiff Excelsior Iron 
Mining Company, subject only to the rights of its 
lessee, the plaintiff Utah Construction Comp,any. 
Appellants assert that in this brief they have demon-
~trated that these findings, and each of them, are not 
supported by substantial evidence, but conversely, the 
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evidence in this case proves that the locations of the 
Lucky claims were made upon ~a par.t of the ''conflict 
area'' which was public dom·ain and subject to location 
a:s lode ·cl·aims. On this basis, and for this reason, the 
appellants assign error in these findings, and each of 
them, and further ·contend that a finding should have 
been made that the part of the mineral deposit in the 
''conflict area'' upon which aP'pellants' locations were 
ntade w~as public domain and subject to location, and 
that the plaintiffs were trespassers upon the same on 
April 30, 1949. 
Before the question of the validity of ·appellants' 
locations can be reached, it is incumbent upon the court 
to pass upon and determine the correctness of the posi-
tion assumed by appellants with respect to the title 
to the mineral deposit in the ''conflict area''. Unless 
this is done, there can be no pro:per determination of 
the VJalidity of appellants' locations. The f·acts as dis-
closed by the evidence in this case and the l·aw applic-
able to such facts bars the road to an 'adjudication of 
the validity of appellants' locations unless and until it 
is determine·d ·that the part of the minel'lal deposit in 
the ''conflict area'' upon which appellants' locations 
were made was or was not a part of the public domain 
on April 30, 1949. 
In the event of an adjudication that the ·part of 
the mineiial deposit in !the ''·conflict are:a'' here involved 
was public ·domain on .A:p·ril 30, 1949, then the ques .. 
tion as to the method •and means pursued by ~appellant 
Justheim in making his locations will be subject to 
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review. On the other hand, if it be determined that on 
... -\pril 30, 1949 plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Comp·any 
held valid legal title to the mineral deposit in the ''con-
flict ·area'', then the question ·as to ·the validity of a ppel-
lants' locations will resolve itself adversely to appellants. 
vn 
THE ENTRANCE OF DEFENDANTS UPO·N 
THE "CONFLICT AREA" FOR THE P·URPOSE 
OF LOCATING THE LUCKY CLAIMS WAS NEI-
THER FRAUDULENT, CLANDESTINE NOR 
SURREPTITIOUS, BUT WAS MADE IN BROAD 
DAYLIGHT WHEN EMPLOYEES AND AGENTS 
OF PLAINTIFFS WERE PRESENT. DEFEND-
ANTS WERE NOT TRESPASSERS BUT EN-
TERED UPON UNAPPROPRIATED PUBLIC 
LAND SUBJECT TO LO~CATION. 
Thirty-four years prior to the making of ~defend­
ants' locations, the defendant Gorlinski has warned 
plaintiffs' pr.edecessor in ·title and its trustee of the 
situation p-revailing with respect to the "conflict tarea'') 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits "Y" and "Z'' ~and Gorlinski's 
testimony, R. 252, 261-266, 269-271) ; but nothing was 
done by plaintiff and its p·redeces'Sor in title wi,th respect 
to locating and patenting the s•ame. The area _was left 
open to loeation. Gorlinski had long ~ceased to occupy a 
fiduciary relationship towards plaintiff and its prede-
cessor in title. The locations were made by Justheim, 
not Gorlinski. Gorlinski was employed by Justheim as 
an engineer (R. 261). The evidence shows that the 
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defendants' entrance into the ''conflict area'' WJas peace-
ful ·and without breach ·of the pe-ace. It was not clan-
destine because it was made op·enly when agen,ts and 
serv~ants of the plaintiff were present. Reference to the 
testimony of plaintiffs' witness Rhodes (R. 202, 203, 
205) shows thlat the pre·sence of J ustheim and Gorlin-
ski on the date of defendants' locations w~as known by 
the servants :and employees of the plaintiff Utah Con-
struction Company. There was no concealment of their 
'presence, nor did they take any action which w·as not 
overt to any observer. The evidence shows that their 
purpose Wlas not concealed. There w~as no misrepresen-
tation as to the purpose or objectives of their presence 
on the property. Gorlinski located defendants' claims 
by use of a transit (R. 239). 
''Every competent loCJator has the right to 
initiate a lawful claim to unoccupied public land 
by a peaceable ~adverse entry upon it while it 
is in the possession of those who have no superi-
or right to acquire title or to hold the posses-
sion." (Nelson v. Smith, 42 Nev. 302, 176 Pac. 
261) 
" * * * If defendant's location was in~alid 
because of the 1absence of a dis·0overy ,cut, ~at the 
time plaintiff made peaceable entry, then the 
territory within the boundaries of defendant's 
claim was at the time op.en to location under the 
mining I~aws, and plaintiff ·could lawfully initi-
,BJte his location within th~ boundaries of the 
Iva C. ·cl,aim, irrespective of what his belief was 
as to territory being unoccupied and una.ppropri· 
a ted * * * and, if the Iva C. location was invalid 
for such reason, it was immaterial to the v~alidity 
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of plaintiff's location th~at plaintiff knew that 
the claim of defendant had been surveyed for 
patent, and the boundaries had been marked on 
the ground, and that the situs of the claim w~as 
known to him, and tha't the defendant had posted 
his patent plats and notices. If. the location of 
defendant was invalid f.or the reasons assigned, 
plaintiff "~as not :a. trespasser when he ~attempted 
to initiate his loca~tion therein. The jury ought 
to have been plainly told that, if ·defendant's 
claim was invalid for the reason assigned, the 
plaintiff could initiate his location within the 
boundaries of such claim." (Wwtsh v. Henry, 38 
Colo. 393, 88 P·ac. 449, 450) 
Appellants p~rticularly emphasize the case of 
Thallmann v. Thomas (111 E-,ed. 277) from which the 
following quotation is taken: 
''A valid claim to unappropriated public land 
cannot be instituted while it is in possession of 
another who has the right to its possession under 
an earlier lawful location. Risch v. Wiseman 
(Or.), 59 Pac. 1111; Seymour v. Fisher, 16 Colo. 
188, 27 P1ac. 240. Nor can such ·a ·claim be initi-
ated by forcible or fraudulent entry upon land 
in possession of one who has no right either to 
the possession or to the title. Atherton v. Fowler, 
96 U. S. 513, 516, 24 L. Ed. 732; Trenouth ·v. San 
Francisco, 100 U.S. 251, 256, 25 L. E·d. 626. But 
every c-ompetent locator has the right to initiate 
a lawful claim to un·app-rop·riated public lan·d by 
a peaceable adverse entry upon it while it is in 
the :possession of those who have no superior 
right to acquire the title or to hold the posse·s-
sion. Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 287, 26 
L. Ed. 735; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 
L. E·d. 485; Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co. 
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(C. C.), 98 Fed. 673, 680. Any other rule would 
make the wrongful occupation of public land by a 
trespasser superior in right to a lawful entry of it 
under the ~acts of ~congress by 1a ~comp~etent lo-
cator. There was nothing in the possession of 
the lode in· this land by the complainants many 
feet below its surface, and their wrongful re-
moval of ore from it, nor in· the defendant's sus-
picion or knowledge of this trespass, nor in the 
fact, if i1t be ~a f~act, that he learned of the tres-
pass through his employment as a miner and 
·shift boss of the ~complainants, to prevent him 
from making an honest and v:alid location of ~a 
mining ~claim upon this unapprop~riated portion 
of the public domain in occordance with the P'ro-
visions of the acts ·of congress whi~ch offered 
him this p·rivilege." (p. 278, 279) 
Cited in the Thallmann case is the important deci-
sion of Belk v. Meagher (104 U.S. 279, 26 L. Ed. 735). 
The ·consideration of the Belk ·case is extremely relevant 
to the present dis-cussion, inasmuch as it appears to be 
the basi~c de~cision of the United States Supreme Court 
with respect to !adverse mineral locations. Belk was 
the plaintiff in an ejectment action against Meagher. 
The court determined that Belk's relocation of the dis-
puted claim was invalid on January 1, 1877, when the 
original ·claims lapsed. His possession of the c1aim 
arose from his location of it and occasional labor upon 
it. O·n February 21, 1877, the defendants entered on 
the :prop·erty ~and made another location, doing all thla.t 
was required to perfe·ct their rights if the premises 
were at the time open to them. The court propounded 
this question for determination : 
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~'Whether, even if the relocation of Belk was 
invalid, the defendants could, after the 1st of 
J·anuary, 1877, make 1a relocation which would 
give them as ·against him 'an exclusive right to 
the possession and enjoyment of the property, 
their entry for that purpose being made peace-
ably and without force." (104 U.S. 281) 
The opinion then continued : 
''This brings us to the inquiry whether the 
possession of Belk, after the 1st of January, 
was such as to prevent the defen·dants from 
making a valid relocation and acquiring title 
under it. * * * 
''Under the provisions of the Revised Stat-
utes relied on, Belk ·could not get a patent for the 
claim he attempted to locate, unless he secured 
what is here made the equivalent of a V!alid 
location by actually holding and working f.or the 
requisite time. If he ~actually held possession and 
worked the claim long enough, and kept all others 
out, his right to .a patent would be complete. He 
hJad no grant of ·any right of possession. His 
ultimate right to a p·atent ;depended entirely on 
·his keeping himself in and all ·others out, 'and 
if he was not ~actually in, he was in law out. A 
peaceable adverse entry, ·coupled with the right 
to hold the possession which w-as thereby a·c-
quired, opertated as an ouster which broke the 
continuity of his holding and deprived him of 
the title he might have got if he had kept in for 
the requisite length of time. He had made no 
such location 1as prevented the lands from being 
in law vacant. Others had the right to enter 
for the purpose of taking.them up, if it could be 
done p·eaceably and without force. * * * 
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''This brings us to the :fl8Jcts of the present 
case. No one ·contends that the defendants 
effected their entry and secured their relocation 
by force. They knew what Belk had done and 
what he was doing. He had no right to the 
~possession, and was only on the land at inter-
VIals. There was no enclosure, 'and he had made 
no improvements. He apparently exercised no 
other acts ·of ownership, ~after January 1, than 
every explorer of the mineral lands of the United 
States does when he goes on them and uses his 
pick to search for and e~amine lodes and veins. 
As his !attempted relocation was invalid, his 
rights were no more than those of a simple 
explorer. In two months he had done, as he 
himself says, 'no hard work on the claim,' and 
he 'probably put two days' work on the ground.' 
This was the extent of his possession. He was 
not an original discoverer, but he :sought to avail 
himself of what others had found. Relying on 
what he ~had done in December, he did not do 
what was ne·cessary to effect a valid relocation 
:after J anUJary 1. His possession might have 
been such as would have enabled him to bring 
an action of trespass against one who entered 
without 'any ·color of right, but it was not enough, 
as we think, to p-revent an entry pea-ceably. land 
in good faith for the purp·ose of securing a right 
under the act of Congress to the exclusive pos-
session and enjoyment of the property. The de-
fendants having got into possession 'and per-
fected a relocation, have secured the better right. 
When this suit mas begun they had not only 
possession but a right granted by the United 
States to ·Continue their possession against all 
adverse ·~claimants. The possession by Belk was 
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that of 'R mere intruder, while that of the defend-
ants was aecqmpanied by color of title. (104 
u.s. 285, 287, 288) 
The decision of the Colorado Sup~reme Court in 
3ft. Rosa; IJiining, 1~/illing & Land Co. v. Palmer (26 
Colo. 56, 56 Pac. 176) is a precedent which requires 
careful consideration in this case. Involved was the 
location of two lode mining claims by the plaintiff sit-
uate within the exterior boundaries of a .certain tract 
of land conveyed tQ the defendant by a gove·rnment 
patent !as placer mining ground. The jury and court 
found that the vein OT lode within the lode claims was 
known to exist within the bowndaries of the place~ at 
the time the defendant applied for patent to such placer. 
The plaintiff's grantors made peacea~le entrance prior 
to application for patent by defendant upon the placer 
area and made location -of the lode mining :claims. 
The court wrote in part as follows : 
" * * * It has been uniformly held that a 
patent for a placer .claim does not ·convey title 
or right of possession to the patentee to any 
lodes known to exist therein ·at the d·~te of appli-
cation; that, if he desires to obtain such title and 
possession, he must comply with the provisions 
of section 2333, an-d patent them as lode claims. 
* • * While we recognize to itf? full extent the 
rule that precludes the initiation of ·a right 
through a trespass upon the lawful possession 
of another, we think, under the establishe-d jjacts 
in this case, appellant is not in a position to 
invoke its protection. The lodes in question were 
known to exist prior to the application for pat-
ent, and, appellant not having taken the neces-
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sary ·steps to obtain possession of them, they 
were open to location by others at the time they 
were loc,ated by the grantor;s of appellee. In 
making the locations, no right of appellant was 
invaded, and their validity, therefore, i~ in no 
way affected by the fact that they were made 
within the surface boundaries of a prior placer 
location." (56 Pac. 177, 178) 
The court therefore determined that the lode locations 
were valid. 
The next important decision on this point to be 
considered is ClippBr Min. Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co. 
(29 Colo. 377, 68 Pac. 286). Here was involved 'a ques-
tion pertaining to the vralidity of location of four lode 
mining claims within a prior placer location. The plain-
tiff's predecessor in title made location of the .Se~arl 
placer and applied for ~patent. The 'application was 
opposed upon the ground that the same Wlas not placer 
ground but was only valuable for lode claims or town 
site purposes. After an investigation, a hearing was 
ordere·d ~and 'application f;or patent was dismissed in 
that it was not made to appear that the ground was 
distinctively valuable for mining purposes or that 
required imp.rovements had been made. This ruling 
was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Land Office 
and the Secretary of the Interior. Twelve days after 
the latter's de~cision, the grantors of the defendant 
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The Colorado Supreme Court then proceeds to dis-
tinguish the facts involved in the Clipper case fron1 
those involved in the .~.lit. Rosa case. It wrote: 
''In the latter ease [Mt. Rosa] the facts were 
that lode claims were kno'""D to exist, and were 
also duly located within the limits of a previously 
located placer claim before patent of the l·atter 
was applied for. A patent for the placer having 
been issued jn suGh circumstances; it was held 
that, inasmuch as the ·ap•plicant did not at the 
time mention the lode claims, or cl·aim them by 
virtue of lode locations, they were excluded from 
the grant of his patent; and,- as it further ap-
peared that the locators_ of these lode ·claims went 
upon the placer ground, -and made locations upon 
veins known to exist before the ap·plication for 
patent was made, the conclusion was that the 
patentee of the placer could not recover posses-
sion of the lode claims, for they were properly 
located. The court said that in making them 
no right of the placer owner was invaded, ·and 
that their validity was not affected by the fact 
that they were made within the surface boun-
daries of a prior placer location. For" the pur-
poses of the case, it must have been -assumed 
as true that when the entry by the locators of 
the lode claims was made the lodes t~hemselves 
were known to exist. If the facts of the case iat . 
bar [Clipper case] were the same as those in 
the Mt. Rosa Case, we would, under its doc-
trine, be obliged to reverse the judgment; but 
they are essentially different, in at least one 
particular, to which we shall hereafter refer.'' 
( 68 P·ac. 288) 
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The ·court then proceeded : 
''In the Mt. Rosa Case, however, wherein was 
defined the rights of a pla:cer claimant, we said 
that a placer location gives a qualified possession 
of the ground located; that is to say, it confers 
upon the owner the exclusive right of posses-
sion of the surface area for all purposes incident 
to the use and operation of the same as a placer 
mining claim, and all unknown lodes or veins, 
but does not give the right of possession to known 
veins within its limits. It is obvious that the 
facts of the ·case in hand [Clipper :case] do not 
bring it within the principles laid down in the 
M t. Rosa Case. If, in the case at bar, the lode 
·claims were known to exist at the time of the 
entry of defendant '.s grantors upon the Se-arl 
placer, under the decision in the Mt. Rosa Case 
the entry was not unlawful; but if, on .the con-
trary, the veins were then unknown, by the same 
decision the right of possession of this ground 
belonged to the ·owners of the placer location. 
Their right of possession included these unknown 
veins, and the entry for prosp~ecting was a tre_s-
pass, and no title could thereby be initiated. 
* * * ·Our conclusion, therefore, is that one may 
n:ot go upon a p~rior valid placer location to 
prosp.ect for wnknown lodes, and get title to lode 
claims thereafter discovered and loca.ted in this 
manner and within the placer boundaries, 'Wnless 
the placer owne.r has abandoned his claim, waives 
the trespass, or by his conduct is estopped to 
complain of it. If the trial ·court in tended to rule 
that in no -circumstances may one, before appli-
cation for a patent of a pl·acer claim, go upon 
the ground within its exterior boundaries for the 
p·urpose of locating a lode, it went too far; * * *. 
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For, under the authorities, a prospector may not 
ente·r upon a prior placer location for the pur-
pose of prospecting for, or locating, unknown 
lodes or veins; and, to uphold the judgment, we 
must presume that the evidence before the trial 
.court showed that the veins or lodes upon which 
defendant's grantors based their locations were 
unknown when they entered upon the Searl 
placer for the purpose of prospecting.'' (68 Pac. 
288, 289. Emphasis supplied.) 
Upon rehearing, the Colorado Supreme Court s.aid: 
''And, in order to uphold the judgment, we 
shall assume, as very properly we may, that the 
trial court, as a matter of fact, found that the 
lodes were not known to exist until ·afte·r the 
application for a patent was made. • * * We 
then had in mind, as we do now, _the distinction 
between the facts of that case [Mt. Rosa] and 
the case at bar. There it was unquestione·d that 
the lode claims were known to exist within the 
limits of the placer location before an application 
for patent for the latter was made. In the case 
at bar, ;as we have seen, the findings -of fact of 
the trial court, which upon this review are con-
clusive upon us, are that the lode claims were 
not known to exist until long after the applica-
tion for the placer patent was filed. The dis-
tinction is vital, and the rule in the two cases 
is different.'' ( 68 Pac. 290, 291) 
The Clipper Min. Co. sued out a writ of error 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and in 194 
U. S. 220, 48 ·Law Ed. 944, 24 Sup. Ct. 632, is found 
the decision of that high ·court.- Mr. Justice Brewer, 
in his opinion, first states the settled rule that in an 
action at law the Supreme Court has no juris·diction to 
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review the ·conclusions of the highest court of the state 
upon a question of facts .. He then proceeds: 
''It must, theref·ore, be aecepted that the 
Searl placer claim was duly located,_ that the an. 
nual labor required by law had been performed 
up to the time of the litigation, that there was a 
subsisting valid placer location, and that the 
lodes were Qiscovered by their locators within 
the boundaries of the placer claim subsequently 
to its location." (194 U.S. 222) 
T~he opinion then repeats -a quotation ma;de by the 
Colorado Sup~reme Court wherein it referred to the 
Mt. Rosa case. This quotation from the Mt. Rosa case 
is set forth above. Further, Justice Brewer writes: 
''A placer location is not a location of lodes 
. or veins un:derneath the ·Surface, but is -simply .a 
claim of a tract or p~arcel of ground for the sake 
-of loose deposits of mineral upon or near the 
surface. A lode or vein may he known to exist 
at the time of the placer location or not known 
until long after a patent therefor has been issued. 
Tjhere being no necess-ary connection between the 
placer and the vein C,ongre:ss by the section has 
~provided that in an application for a p~lacer patent 
the applicant shall include any vein or lode of 
which he has possession, and that if he does not 
make such inclusion the omission is to be taken as 
a ~conclusive declaration that he has no right of 
possession of such vein or lode. If, however, 
no vein ·or lode within the placer claim is known 
to ~xist at the time the p~atent is issued, then the 
patentee takes title to any which may be sub-
sequently discovered. 
"While by the ~statute the right of exclusive 
possession and enjoyment is given to ·a locator, 
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whether his location be of a lode claim or a 
placer claim, yet the effect of a patent is differ-
ent. The patent of .a lode claim confirms the 
original location, with the right of exclusive 
possession and conveys title to the tract covered 
by the location together with all veins, lodes 
and ledges which have their a1)iexes therein, 
whereas the patent to the placer claim, while 
confirming the original location and conveying 
title to the placer ground, does not necessarily 
convey the title to all veins, lodes and ledges 
within its area. It makes no differen·ce whether 
a vein or lode within the boundaries of a lode 
claim is known or unknown, for the locator is 
entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoy-
ment of all the veins and lodes and the patent 
confirms his title to them. But a patent of a 
placer claim will not convey the title to a known 
vein or lode Vtithin its area unless that vein is 
specifically applied and- paid for. 
• • • • • 
"We agree with the Supreme Court -of _ Coljo-
rado ·as to the law when it S'ays that 'one may not 
go upon a p-rior valid placer location to p·rospect 
for unknown lodes and -get title to lode claims 
thereafter discovered and located in this manner 
and within the ~placer boundaries, unless the 
placer owner has ·abandoned his claim, waives 
the trespass, or by his conduct is estopped to 
complain of it.' " (p. 228-229, 230) 
The above review of_ the Clipper -case, through its 
appell'ate procedure reveals definitely the vital point 
which must be kept in mind in this case and which 
will be hereinafter discussed. 
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A.s usual, Mr. Lindley summarizes the whole matter 
in the following quotation from his Treatise: 
''We are justified in deducing from the fore-
going the following conclusions :-
'' ( 1) A perfected placer location does not 
confer the right to the possession of veins or 
lodes, which may be found to exist within' the 
p·lacer limits ~at any time prior to filing. 'an appli-
cation for a placer patent; 
'' {2) Such lodes may be ·appropriated (a) 
.by the placer claimant or (b) by others, pro-
vided the appropriation is effected by pe'aceable 
methods and in good faith; 
'' ( 3) Where a lode is known to exist within 
the limits of a placer location at any time prior 
to t·he placer application for patent, -and is not 
claimed in the ·application as a lode, the title to 
such lode does not pass by the patent, but it 
may be located by anyone having the requisite 
qualifications, provided the location is made 
peaceably and in good faith.'' (II Lindley on 
Mines, § 413, pp. 966-967) 
The facts of the instant case bring it within the 
rule of the Mt. Rosa case above cited and not of the 
Clipper c'ase, snp•ra. The evidence is clear and undis-
puted that the existence of the Armstrong ''iron mine" 
was well known at the time app,lication for patent to 
the Armstrong placer was made; otherwise the appli-
cation would not have· include~d a ·des-cription of part 
of the iron mine and the patent to Walker and Blair 
would have made no reference to it. The mineral deposit 
manifestly was a well-known, notorious geological fact 
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prior to the application for the Armstrong placer patent 
and prior to the issuance of the p'atent. The patent 
itself ·proves that the deposit existed and knowledge of 
its existence 1nust be ilnputed conclusively to the 
patentees. They elected to secure title to a. part of this 
deposit but failed to secure title to that part of it within 
the "conflict area". Neither the patentees nor their 
successors in title are in a position to contend that 
that part of the mineral deposit within the ''·conflict 
area'' was unknown to the patentees. Judge Marshall 
in his opinion in Equity Action 522 antici1}a ted this sit-
uation, for he wrote: 
'' * * * In accordance with the ·directions from 
the G. L. 0. and on November 15, 1879, Ferdinand 
Dickert, a U. S. Deputy Mineral Surveyor, was 
directed to make an official survey of the lode 
within the placer so as to show its true boun-
daries. He went. upon the ·grounds ·and marked 
the boundaries of the lode claim, making it ap-
proximately 390 ft. in length and 225 ft. in 
width with the discovery point of the lode in the. 
·center of the south end line; thereafter on Decem-
ber 16, 1879, a patent was duly issued to the 
grantees :of the ap'P'licant for the Armstrong 
Placer and for this lode specifically describing 
it by the ·description returned. by Mr. Dickert. 
* * *It is incredible that if the discovery point of 
the Armstrong lode placed by him [Dickert] on 
this line was known to be on the vein that it could 
have been supposed that the vein suddenly 
ceased at that point. * * * The position of th·e 
plaintiff seems to be that if a placer limits prior 
to the application for a patent it becomes a known 
vein only to the extent of the actual dis·covery; 
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only for the few feet he may see it does it fall 
within the ·category -of known veins. He then 
with respect to this vein would occu'py a vas~ly 
more advantageous ·position than the ordinary 
dis·coverer of a vein. He would not be required 
to make any exploration to determine the direc-
tion of the lode which had been discovered at 
one point. Indeed, under this construction of the 
law it would advantage him not to develop the 
ground. The greater the· extent of the lode he 
developed the more ground he would be required 
t'o pay a double price for. This, I think, was not 
the intent of Congress. When an owner of a 
placer prior to application for patent once knows 
of the existence of a vein within the exterior 
limits of his claim although he has only dis~ 
covered it at one point, the vein, whatever its 
extent is in the category of known veins. He 
can only obtain title to it by virtue of a lode 
location. His placer location before patent gives 
him no right to any known vein. If unknown 
however a patent to the placer ·confers title. * • • 
The surface lines adop~ted by him limit his right 
to the vein to the same extent as if he had only 
a lode location. He has the oppo-rtunity to de· 
velop the ·course of his lode and must suffer the 
consequences of a failure to do so. To the extent 
the vein is not covered his application for a 
patent is conclusive decla~ation that he has no 
rig·ht to it.'' 
From the :foregoing, the conclusion is irrefutable 
that when Justheim made the location of the Lucky 
claims on that part of the mineral deposit in the ''con· 
fiict area'' he was not a tresp·asser and his entry and 
presence was not tortious. He had a right to be there. 
He did not go onto the Armstrong placer to explore or 
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discover the existence of the Armstrong ''iron ntine ''. 
He went for the purpose of locating lode claims upon 
a deposit "~hich "~as known to exist prior to the issuance 
of th_~ ,,~ alker-Blair patent and application therefor. 
Through all of the years it had remained open 
public domain subject to location Wlder the min-
ing laws of the United States and the State of 
Utah. Were the la-'v other than that elucidated 
by the Jlt. Rosa and Clipper cases, the whole pur-
pose of R.S. 2333 (U.S.C ... :\.., Tit. 30, § 37) would be 
defeated. Although the patentee of a placer obtained 
no title to a lode which was known to him to exist p·rior 
to the application for the placer patent, but which was 
not included in the patent, he could prevent the location 
of the lode by others on the ground that thir·d party 
locators were trespassers. This certainly is not the 
law. The Armstrong patent, when it failed to include 
the part of the "iron mine" within the "conflict area", 
in effect declared it was open for location by third 
parties. When Justheim made his locations, he availed 
himself of an invitation long extended to the public 
by the ·plaintiff, Excelsior Iron Mining Co., and its 
predecessors in title. 
With the foregoing discussion, Gorlinski 's long-·~o 
relationship with plaintiff's predecessor in title and 
its trustee becomes an irrelevant and immaterial matter. 
Insofar as the validity of Justheim's locations is· con-
cerned, Justheim could have secured his information 
from the public records or from any ·other source of 
information. Gorlinski at the time of his en;tployment 
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by Justheim to make the Lucky locations was under no 
obligations of any kind to the plaintiffs or to their 
pTedecessors in title. No fiduciary relationship existed 
between them. Further, the p·eriodic litigation involv-
ing the ''conflict area'' had a:rs.closed to the public the 
condition existing in the "conflict area" and its poten-
tialities. The conclusion must be on this aspect of the 
case that the area of the mineral ~deposit covered by 
the Lucky claims was open J)Ublic domain which Just-
heim had the right to enter upon for the purpose of 
locating his claims. 
It is proper at this time to invite the Supreme 
Court's attention to its decision in Spring-er v. Southern 
Pac. Go. (67 Utah 590, 248 Pac. 819). While this invi-
tation is undoubtedly in anticipation of appellees' argu-
ment, frankness .demands that this decision be dis-
cussed. In the instant action appellees particularly 
pleaded in their rep,ly to the counterclaim and cross 
complaint of appellant Justheim that the claim of said 
cross complaint was barred by the provisions of Sec-
tion 7, Chap. 2, Title 104, Utah Code 1943 and Sec-
tion 38, Chapter 2, Title 30, United States Code Anno-
tate·d (the Federal statute thus designated is identical 
with R.S. 2332). The trial court in this action found 
adversely to the appellees' plea of adverse possession 
and statute of limitations in their reply. Finding 16 
specifically recites: 
'' '* * * Neither of the plaintiffs nor the p~ain­
tiffs' predecessors, have been working. the ore 
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body in controversy continuously for a period of 
seven years next prior to April 3, 1949." (R. 79) 
This finding stands unimpaired and as a consequenc.e 
the questions of adverse possession and statute of limi-
tations have been eliminated from the instant case and 
it is on this point that the instant case is ~different from 
the Springer case n1entioned. In that decision the ques-
tion discllSSed ,,~as 'vhether R.S. 2332 (U.S.C.A. Tit. 
30, § 38) ·could be successfully pleaded and sustained 
by the defendant in that action 'vhen the evidence showed 
that it had been in possession for over twenty con-
tinuous ye·ars of a part of the public ·domain- under 
void lode claim locations. The evidence showed t·he con-
tinuous open adverse_ p·ossession of a disputed area 
by the defendant, the expenditure by it of _large sums 
of money thereon, and the payment of ad valorem taxes. 
The court concluded that as ·against adverse placer lo-
cators the plea of R.S. 2332 could be sustained. While 
there is language used in the case as to the conduct of 
the placer locators (being the plaintiffs' p~redecessors in 
title), the opinion deals basically with the question of the 
applicability of R.S. 2332. The ·holding in the Springe1· 
case is of no value in the instant case, first because the 
appellees failed in their proof of adverse possession 
and the statute of limitations and secondly the actions 
of the defendants in making the Lucky locations were 
neither fraudulent, surreptitious nor deceitful. As has 
been demonstrated, the part of the mineral deposit 
within the "conflict area" located by J ustheim was 
public domain and the plaintiffs and appellees, since 
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they failed in their plea of adverse possession and -stat-
ute of limitations, were trespassessers thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing ~dis~cus~sion, the following con-
clusions are presented by the appellants: 
1. That the ''conflict area'' insofar as the Ann-
strong ''iron mine'' is concerned actually exists as a 
matter of official re·cords. 
2. That the patent to Jones of Tract A vested 
him with no title to that part of the deposit in the "con-
flict area'' upon which the Lucky locations are made. 
3. That since Jones had no title to that part of 
the ''conflict area" upon which the Lucky locations 
were made, his quitclaim deed to the predecessor in 
title of the plaintiff Excelsior Iron Mining Company 
conveyed nothing to it and hence said plaintiff has 
no ti tie to same. 
4. That the conveyance by the United States Gov .. 
ernment to Walker and Blair of the part of the Arm-
strong ''iron mine'' de'Scribed in the Armstrong patent 
conveyed no interest in that ·part of the mineral deposit 
within the ' 'conflict area''. 
5. That that p~art of the mineral ~deposit within 
the ''conflict area'' except Tract A was public domain 
and open to location by others. 
6. That Justheim was not a trespasser in making 
his locations of the Lucky claims but made them upon 
public domain as of right. 
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7. That the Lucky claims are valid subsisting loca-
tions owned by the defendant J ustheim. 
WHEREFORE, .A.PPELLANTS RESPECTFUL-
LY SUBMIT THAT THE JUDGMENT IN THIS 
ACTION SHOlTLD BE SET ASIDE AND THAT THE 
SUPRE~fE COURT SHOULD DIRECT THE DIS-
TRICT COURT TO l\IAKE, ENTER AND FILE ITS 
JUDGMENT QUIETING THE TITLE IN AND TO 
THE LUCKY CLAIMS IN THE APPELLANT, 
·JUSTHEIM, .A.G.AlNST ALL CLAIMS, INTERESTS, 
TITLES OR DE~IANDS OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND 
EACH OF THEM. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
Atto.rney for DefendOJn,ts and Appell01nts 
312 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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